



# Dynamic IPv6 Prefix Problems and VPNs

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# #whoami: Johannes Weber



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  - Firewall
  - VPN/Crypto
  - Routing/Switching
  - Mail
- IPv6
- DNSSEC
  
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- [@webernetz](#)



# Agenda

- Migration from IPv4 to IPv6 -> Changed Concepts/Principles
- IPv6 Site-to-Site VPNs
- IPv6 Dynamic Prefix Problems
- Examples: Screenshots from Juniper ScreenOS
  - Yes, it's End-of-Everything
  - But: Cheap for labs, almost complete layer 3 functionalities: PPPoE w/ IPv6, DHCPv6-PD
  - ~~Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet FortiGate, Cisco ASA~~
- ~~Stats: IPv6 Adoption~~



# Wording

- Route-Based VPN Tunnels
  - Each VPN tunnel has a tunnel-interface
  - Appropriate routes into tunnel-interfaces
  - Tunnel-interfaces are bound to security-zones
- Scenarios
  - Three zones per firewall: **untrust, trust, vpn(-tunnel)**
  - Headquarter  $\leftrightarrow$  Remote Office / Home Office / Subsidiary / Partner



# IPv6 Site-to-Site VPNs




# What's a VPN Tunnel for?

- Wikipedia: “A virtual private network (VPN) extends a private network across a public network [...]”
- “They are used to securely connect geographically separated offices of an organization [...]”
- → Traffic intended for a **secure** VPN tunnel **MUST NOT** traverse the unsecure Internet!
- Example: securing mail transfers between two partner MTAs




# IPv4 Site-to-Site VPN



- Only private (RFC1918) IPv4 addresses on both sites
- Route into Tunnel Interface
- Security Policy from trust -> vpn (and vice versa)
- → If VPN tunnel is down, nothing happens. At least the ISP router discards private IPv4 addresses.
- → Both ends are neither addressable nor accessible



# IPv6 Site-to-Site VPN




- Routable Global Unicast Addresses (GUA) on both sites
- → **If VPN tunnel is down, packets might traverse successfully through the (unencrypted) Internet!**
- → Both ends ARE addressable and possibly accessible (DMZ)





# IPv6 Site-to-Site VPN Principles





# Example

- End-to-End communication without VPN:

```
C:\Users\Johannes Weber>tracert -d lx.webernetz.net
Routenverfolgung zu jw-nb12.webernetz.net [2003:51:6012:110::9]
über maximal 30 Hops:
```

1	1 ms	1 ms	1 ms	2003:50:aa0a:3584::1
2	3 ms	2 ms	2 ms	2003:0:1301:4205::1
3	4 ms	6 ms	6 ms	2003:0:1301:4238::2
4	6 ms	7 ms	7 ms	2003:0:1302:403::1
5	4 ms	3 ms	4 ms	2003:0:1302:403::2
6	5 ms	4 ms	4 ms	2003:51:6012::2
7	5 ms	5 ms	5 ms	2003:51:6012:110::9

Ablaufverfolgung beendet.

- And with VPN:

```
C:\Users\Johannes Weber>tracert -d lx.webernetz.net
Routenverfolgung zu jw-nb12.webernetz.net [2003:51:6012:110::9]
über maximal 30 Hops:
```

1	1 ms	1 ms	1 ms	2003:50:aa0a:3584::1
2	*	*	*	Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.
3	6 ms	6 ms	7 ms	2003:51:6012:110::9

Ablaufverfolgung beendet.



# Broken VPN -> Still Permanent Route (RO)

Reports > Policies > Traffic Log fd-we-fw01 ?

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**Juniper NETWORKS**

SSG5-Serial-WLAN

Condition	Service	Action
any-IPv6	ANY	Permit

Destination Address/Port	Translated Source Address/Port	Translated Destination Address/Port	Service	Duration	Bytes Sent	Bytes Received	Close Reason
2003:51:6012:110::9:1	2003:50:aa0a:3584:a5da:5d0d:b394:2ac0:10658	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	ICMPV6	60 sec.	130	0	Close - AGE OUT
2003:51:6012:110::9:1	2003:50:aa0a:3584:a5da:5d0d:b394:2ac0:10657	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	ICMPV6	60 sec.	130	0	Close - AGE OUT
2003:51:6012:110::9:1	2003:50:aa0a:3584:a5da:5d0d:b394:2ac0:10656	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	ICMPV6	60 sec.	130	0	Close - AGE OUT
2003:51:6012:110::9:1	2003:50:aa0a:3584:a5da:5d0d:b394:2ac0:10655	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	ICMPV6	60 sec.	130	0	Close - AGE OUT
2003:51:6012:110::9:1	2003:50:aa0a:3584:a5da:5d0d:b394:2ac0:10654	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	ICMPV6	62 sec.	130	0	Close - AGE OUT
2003:51:6012:110::9:1	2003:50:aa0a:3584:a5da:5d0d:b394:2ac0:10653	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	ICMPV6	62 sec.	130	0	Close - AGE OUT
							Close -

**Navigation Menu:**

- Network
  - Binding
  - DNS
    - Zones
  - Interfaces
    - DHCP
    - DHCPV6
    - 802.1X
  - Routing
    - Destination
    - Source
    - Source Interface
    - MCast Routing
  - PBR
  - Virtual Routers
- PPP
  - DSCP
- Security
  - Policy
    - Policies
    - MCast Policies
  - Policy Elements
- VPNs



# Deleted Route -> Still Deny Policy (RO)

Reports > Policies > Traffic Log fd-we-fw01 ?

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SSG5-Serial-WLAN

- Network
  - Binding
  - + DNS
    - Zones
  - + Interfaces
    - DHCP
    - DHCPV6
    - + 802.1X
  - Routing
    - Destination
    - Source
    - Source Interfac
    - MCast Routing
  - + PBR
  - Virtual Routers
  - + PPP
    - DSCP
  - + Security
    - Policy
      - Policies
      - MCast Policies
    - + Policy Elements
  - + VPNs

ID	Source	Destination	Service	Action
68	Weberinternet/Any-IPv6	Untrust/2003:51:6012:110::/64	ANY	Reject

Source Address/Port	Destination Address/Port	Translated Source Address/Port	Translated Destination Address/Port	Service	Duration	Bytes Sent	Bytes Received	Close Reason
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10777	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10776	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10775	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10774	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10773	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10772	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10771	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10770	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
60:aa0a:3584:2ce2:780f:8278:f1df:10769	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied



# Deleted Remote Policy -> Still HQ Policy/uPRF

- Route and deny policy are deleted on remote site
- HQ still blocks connections

```
C:\Users\Johannes Weber>tracert -d lx.webernetz.net
Routenverfolgung zu jw-nb12.webernetz.net [2003:51:6012:110::9]
über maximal 30 Hops:
```

```
 1      1 ms      1 ms      1 ms  2003:50:aa0a:3584::1
 2      3 ms      3 ms      3 ms  2003:0:1301:4205::1
 3      7 ms      4 ms      5 ms  2003:0:1301:4238::2
 4      6 ms     18 ms     16 ms  2003:0:1302:403::1
 5      3 ms      3 ms      3 ms  2003:0:1302:403::2
 6      *         *         *     Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.
 7      *         *         *     Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.
 8      *         *         *     Zeitüberschreitung der Anforderung.
```



# Deleted Remote Policy -> Still HQ uRPF

Reports > System Log > Event fd-wv-fw01 ?

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2015-08-16 22:11:52	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:48	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:44	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:40	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:36	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:32	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:28	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:24	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:20	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:15	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:11	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:07	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.
2015-08-16 22:11:05	alert	IP spoofing! From 2003:50:aa0a:3584:8c7:d955:b240:ed99 to 2003:51:6012:110::9, proto 58 (zone Untrust, int ethernet0/1). Occurred 1 times.



# Deleted Remote Policy -> Still HQ Policy

Reports > Policies > Traffic Log fd-wv-fw01 ?

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**Juniper** NETWORKS

SSG5-Serial-WLAN

- Source Interfaces
- MCast Routing
- + PBR
- Virtual Routers
- + PPP
- DSCP
- + **Security**
- **Policy**
- Policies
- MCast Policies
- + Policy Elements
- VPNs
- AutoKey IKE
- AutoKey Advanced
- Gateway
- P1 Proposal
- P2 Proposal
- XAuth Settings
- VPN Groups
- MODECFG Profiles
- Manual Key
- + L2TP
- Monitor Status

ID	Source	Destination	Service	Action
277	Untrust/2003:50:aa0a:3584::/64	DMZ/Any-IPv6	ANY	Reject

Source Address/Port	Destination Address/Port	Translated Source Address/Port	Translated Destination Address/Port	Service	Duration	Bytes Sent	Bytes Received	Close Reason
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10836	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10835	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	40	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10834	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10833	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	40	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10832	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10831	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10830	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	40	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10829	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	72	Traffic Denied
0:aa0a:3584:e4c1:9434:c6bf:1189:10825	2003:51:6012:110::9:1	0.0.0.0:0	0.0.0.0:0	ICMPV6	0 sec.	0	40	Traffic Denied



# IPv6 Site-to-Site VPN - Conclusion

- With these four principles/recommendations it is possible to ensure that IPv6 traffic which should only traverse through a secure VPN connection **won't ever traverse through the Internet**, even in case of a VPN failure on any of those sites.
- They furthermore ensure, **that security is not made only at the network layer (routing), but at a firewall stage (policy)**.
- Questions so far?





# Dynamic IPv6 Prefix Problems




# Dynamic Prefix/Address Assumptions


- Quite common on private ISP connections in Germany
- „Zwangstrennung“ every 6 month (formerly every 24 hours)
- And after every reboot of the router
- → Customers are using those cheap ISP connections for home offices, trade fairs, mobile stands, distributed disaster recovery offices, ...
- And of course: IT admins at home ;)
- For the remainder of this talk:
  - GUAs, not ULAs (no NAT/NPT/othershit!)
  - Local breakouts (due to bandwidth; NextGen-Firewalls, APT-Sensors)




# (1) Multiple DNS Updates



# (1) Multiple DNS Updates -> Solution?



## (2) FQDN-based Security Policies





## (2) FQDN-based Security Policies -> Solution?

- DNS Resource Records „APL“, Lists of Address Prefixes, RFC 3123
- `ipv6-doc.weberdns.de. IN APL 2:2001:db8::/32`
- Only „experimental“ <- in fact: not used anywhere
  
- Small challenge everyone?
- What's the APL of `tr18.weberdns.de`?





## (2) FQDN-based Security Policies -> Solution?

- Another idea: Shifting the prefix length on FQDN objects
- E.g.: One device updates its /128 IPv6 DNS name
- Firewall interprets this object as a /56
- Not used anywhere, too



# (3) Routing into VPN Tunnels & Solution!







# (3) Routing into VPN Tunnels Example HQ

	IP/Prefix	Gateway	Interface	Protocol	Preference	Metric	Vsys	Description	Configure
*	2003:51:6012:140::/64	2003:51:6012:101::4	ethernet0/6	S	20	1	Root		<a href="#">Remove</a>
*	::/0	2003:51:6012::1	ethernet0/1	SP	20	1	Root		<a href="#">Remove</a>
*	2003:51:6012::2/64	::	ethernet0/1	C			Root		-
*	2003:51:6012::2/128	::	ethernet0/1	H			Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:110::1/64	::	ethernet0/5.10	C			Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:110::1/128	::	ethernet0/5.10	H			Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:101::1/64	::	ethernet0/6	C			Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:101::1/128	::	ethernet0/6	H			Root		-
	2003:51:6012:110::/64	::	ethernet0/5.10	O	60	100	Root		-
	2003:51:6012:101::/64	::	ethernet0/6	O	60	100	Root		-
*	2003:50:aa0c:1300::/64	fe80::fce5:40ff:fe14:1	tunnel.2	O	60	10100	Root		-
*	2003:50:aa0c:1342:b2c6:9aff:fefd:ca97/128	fe80::fce5:40ff:fe14:1	tunnel.2	O	60	10000	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:102::/64	fe80::21a:6cff:fea1:2b98	ethernet0/6	O	60	200	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:130::/64	fe80::2a94:fff:fea8:772d	ethernet0/6	O	60	200	Root		-



# (3) Routing into VPN Tunnels Example R0

IPv6 Routing Table -- trust-vr									
	IP/Prefix	Gateway	Interface	Protocol	Preference	Metric	Vsys	Description	Configure
*	::/0	fe80::462b:3ff:fe19:300	ethernet0/0	D	252	1	Root		<a href="#">Remove</a>
*	2003:50:aa7f:8c13:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca80/64	::	ethernet0/0	C			Root		-
*	2003:50:aa7f:8c13:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca80/128	::	ethernet0/0	H			Root		-
*	2003:50:aa0c:1300:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca8c/64	::	bgroup1	C			Root		-
*	2003:50:aa0c:1300:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca8c/128	::	bgroup1	H			Root		-
	2003:50:aa0c:1300::/64	::	bgroup1	O	60	100	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:101::/64	fe80::d2fc:c0ff:fe14:2	tunnel.1	O	60	10100	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:110::/64	fe80::d2fc:c0ff:fe14:2	tunnel.1	O	60	10100	Root		-
*	2003:50:aa0c:1342:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca97/64	::	wireless0/2	C			Root		-
*	2003:50:aa0c:1342:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca97/128	::	wireless0/2	H			Root		-
	2003:50:aa0c:1342:b2c6:9aff:fed:ca97/128	::	wireless0/2	O	60		Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:102::/64	fe80::d2fc:c0ff:fe14:2	tunnel.1	O	60	10200	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:130::/64	fe80::d2fc:c0ff:fe14:2	tunnel.1	O	60	10200	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:160::/64	fe80::d2fc:c0ff:fe14:2	tunnel.1	O	60	10200	Root		-
*	2003:51:6012:180::/64	fe80::d2fc:c0ff:fe14:2	tunnel.1	O	60	10110	Root		-



## (3) Routing into VPN Tunnels & Solution?

- Another possible solution: Two prefixes on the link
  - A) dynamic prefix from the ISP
  - B) static prefix from the HQ through VPN tunnel
  - But „Source-Address-Dependent Routing“ brings other problems! (RFC 8043)
- Or: ULAs with NPT



# Dynamic IPv6 Prefix Problems - Conclusion

- Yes, IPv6 solves the address problem
- Yes, you can greatly structure your address plan
- BUT: Common workarounds for „dynamic IPv4 addresses“ do NOT work for „dynamic IPv6 prefixes“!



# Dynamic IPv6 Prefix Problems - Conclusion

- → Go for static/persistent IPv6 prefixes!
- At least in customer environments
- If not: you have to deal with it ;(
- RIPE 690 Best Current Operational Practice for Operators:
  - "Non-persistent prefixes are considered **harmful** in IPv6 as you can't avoid issues that may be caused by simple end-user power outages, so assigning **persistent prefixes** is a safer and simpler approach."
  - "Trying to deploy new services or applications with non-persistent prefixes is always **more difficult and costly**, and will increase time spent on troubleshooting."
- → Go for static/persistent IPv6 prefixes!



# Questions? Comments?

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<https://blog.webernetz.net/ipv6>

[@webernetz](#)