A PKI distributed is a PKI solved

authorization and authentication for a connected world.



A PKI decentralized is a PKI solved



Who we are

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Ein Schwank aus der Geschichte

- FX@TollCollect.de
- ISO 20828 appears
- Years of research happen
- You receive: a new PKI!



The ISO 20828 Challenge: Independence from central CAs and connectivity



Size does matter

- Road networks are monsters DE: 13K+645K km, CN: 143K+6M km
- Needs to cover the whole country
- Distributed system of road-side infrastructure



Non-trivial number of moving targets

- The number of registered vehicles is staggering DE: 50M, USA:270M
- Efficient verification in maintenance scenarios
- Certificate management for V2x / C2x Communication



Mostly everything is federated

- Multi-layer hierarchy Germany: EU, federal, state, district, municipal
- Strategy: middle to high tiers
- Tactical: local



No infrastructure, no life

- Resiliency
- Resiliency
- Resiliency
- Resiliency



Why then have single points of failure?

- OCSP & CRL
- Central by design
- Can only be checked when online
- ISO 20828 wanted to fix that!



How they apply to other industries

Every non-trivial PKI faces the same challenges

- Push towards decentralization
- Exponential growth in permission levels, roles, capabilities
- Need for resiliency
- We want better failure modes!



Cross-industry applications



SCADA / ICS / IIoT

- Similar challenges to automotive sector regarding size
- Arguably more critical and dependent on resilience
- Replacements, provisioning & maintenance in the field
- More often than not: Resilient or boom scenario



SMART GRID





SMART GRID



Automotive & Smart City

- V2x communication
- Autonomous driving and parking
- Car-sharing scenarios





SMART CITY









Internet of S...tuff

- IoT
 - Ridiculous device numbers
 - Arbitrarily complex networking
 - High price-pressure --> low performance platforms
- Smart Home & Building
 - Federated access control
 - Network on card applications
 - Must be resilient to outages



SMART HOME





SMART HOME





eGOV: eIDAS / nPA / EU Citizen Card

- Common identity platform
- Based on FIDO
- Per-service sub-identities





SMART GOV





Tying it all together

- Common system to handle identity and delegation
- Scenarios defined by Trust Policy Language
- Interoperability without compromising privacy



Cross-domain access control & delegation





X.509 outage scenarios



SEPTEMBER 3, 2011 IT WAS A SATURDAY MORNING...

REVOCATION DAY

What no one wants to talk about

- Revoking intermediates requires central nodes (OCSP, CRL)
- Revocation prunes whole sub-trees



Ask yourself

Did any of the companies responsible for large CA fuckups manage to retain their customers?





How ISO 20828 proposes to safe us all

authorization and authentication for a connected world.



ISO 20828 Requirements

- No shared overall infrastructure Easily integrate into existing security systems with minimal impact
- Breaking a part does not break the whole
- Support low-resource devices
- Allow for mobile devices and sporadic communication



ISO 20828 Security Domains





P2P approach

- Nodes communicate with other nodes
- Able to proof to each other whether this is okay



Fine granular trust

- Permissions can be arbitrarily precise
- Delegate all or some of them



Federation

- Different permission levels based on hierarchy and device type
- Backup trust paths outside strict hierarchies
- Enable participants to make local decisions!



Trinity: A Generalization of 20828



Transport agnostic communication

The way you get the news does not matter. Pick the best one available at the time!



Trust Policy Languages

- Express permissions, roles, capabilities
- Arbitrary precision and sub-dividable expressions
- Extensible in the field
- Mathematically proven



Offline capabilities

- Everything is offline verifiable
- Designed with store & forward networking in mind



How Toll Collect would work with Trinity

authorization and authentication for a connected world.



The problem space

Toll Collect is a tremendously complex distributed system





Problems in space

And Distances of the

How it's done

- DSRC between vehicle and KonAu
- Cable to the backend
- Individual key per vehicle
 - Smartcard in vehicle
 - Stored in TC backend



The obvious threat actors

authorization and authentication for a connected world.





The non-obvious threat actors







Happy Path







Adversarial conditions Graceful degradation to S&F networking











Why this works

- Delegations are CRDTs
- Revocations don't exist explicitly
- Delegation changes are atomic



What's it actually good for!



Dezentralized mesh VPN w/ delegation

If you scale to IPv6, also scale your trust!

IPsec whitepaper @ p3ki.com



Globally delegatable SSO



Threat intel sharing



Change management



Revocation Day w/ P3KI Trinity

Thank you!

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