A close-up photograph of a sandcastle on a beach. The sandcastle is meticulously built to resemble the Android robot, with two antennae on its head, two circular eyes, and a segmented body. The background is a soft-focus view of the ocean and sky. A semi-transparent black rounded rectangle is overlaid on the bottom right of the image, containing the title and author's name in white text.

Beyond Java: Obfuscating Android Apps with Purely Native Code

Laurie Kirk

whoami

- ▶ Laurie Kirk
- ▶ Reverse Engineer at Microsoft
- ▶ Specialize in cross-platform malware with a focus on mobile malware
- ▶ Run YouTube channel @lauriewired
- ▶ Representing myself as an individual security researcher today (not representing Microsoft)



@lauriewired


Analysis Materials



- ▶ LaurieWired TROOPERS23 Github Repo
 - ▶ https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative_Troopers23

The only difference between this app...

6aaa73a0c642d4ec945e8af438d5a2eaf93ddb5162edda0ad675ba459cf93a83



5 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

6aaa73a0c642d4ec945e8af438d5a2eaf93ddb5162edda0ad675ba459cf93a83
utils5.apk
android apk

5.11 MB
Size

2023-04-23 22:36:06 UTC
1 minute ago



DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label trojan.smsspy/anubis

Threat categories trojan banker

Family labels smsspy anubis

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

Avira (no cloud)	ANDROID/Spy.SmsSpy.GAG.Gen	Cynet	Malicious (score: 99)
F-Secure	Malware.ANDROID/Spy.SmsSpy.GAG.Gen	Kaspersky	HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n
ZoneAlarm by Check Point	HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n	Acronis (Static ML)	Undetected

... and this app

c679fa2522276e1101e7062cfaea21ac35a08d38026878244dc715b8079a9f06

0 / 65

Community Score

✔ No security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

c679fa2522276e1101e7062cfaea21ac35a08d38026878244dc715b8079a9f06
stringsinnative.apk

android apk contains-elf

5.89 MB Size

2023-04-23 23:27:41 UTC a moment ago

APK

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Security vendors' analysis Do you want to automate checks?

Acronis (Static ML)	✔ Undetected	AhnLab-V3	✔ Undetected
Alibaba	✔ Undetected	ALYac	✔ Undetected
Antiy-AVL	✔ Undetected	Arcabit	✔ Undetected
Avast	✔ Undetected	Avast-Mobile	✔ Undetected
AVG	✔ Undetected	Avira (no cloud)	✔ Undetected

is that part of the code is written in C++.

Agenda

- ▶ Obfuscate an Android app
- ▶ Use purely native code
- ▶ Mask our API calls



Java is the main language in Android



Managed code

Java / Kotlin



Native code

C / C++

C++ == obfuscation?

Same file except I added a blank C++ stub

3927b4868b18203de6e5b2eb208096999ee72c35d0f7d5f7f8cbb7eafc4385d0



Community Score

2 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

3927b4868b18203de6e5b2eb208096999ee72c35d0f7d5f7f8cbb7eafc4385d0
utilsnative1.apk

5.87 MB Size | 2023-04-23 23:08:11 UTC a moment ago

android apk contains-elf

APK

- DETECTION
- DETAILS
- RELATIONS
- BEHAVIOR
- COMMUNITY

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label **trojan.anubis** Threat categories trojan banker Family labels anubis

Security vendors' analysis Do you want to automate checks?


Kaspersky	HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n	ZoneAlarm by Check Point	HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Anubis.n
Acronis (Static ML)	Undetected	AhnLab-V3	Undetected
Alihaha	Undetected	AI Yar	Undetected

ADD C++ CODE

3 ANTIVIRUSES STOP DETECTING

Further Native Obfuscation Advantages

- ▶ More challenging to reverse engineer
 - ▶ Read assembly instead of Java
 - ▶ Understand JNI invocations
- ▶ Remove x86 support to thwart emulators



How far can we go?

Purely Native Code Methodology

Remove Java entrypoint



Translate methods to C++




Conceal Android API calls

Removing the Java Entrypoint

The background features abstract geometric shapes in various shades of blue, including light blue, medium blue, and dark blue. These shapes are layered and overlap, creating a modern, minimalist aesthetic. The shapes are primarily located on the right side of the slide, with some extending towards the center.

The Manifest defines entrypoints in Java



Hands On: Finding the Standard Entrypoint

The background features abstract geometric shapes in various shades of blue, including light blue, medium blue, and dark blue. These shapes are layered and overlap, creating a dynamic, modern aesthetic. The shapes are primarily located on the right side of the slide, with some extending towards the left.


Is this possible to bypass?

Android Provides NativeActivity

- ▶ Helper class provided in Android framework
- ▶ Used for gaming apps
- ▶ Calls the native library specified in metadata




Android Purely NativeActivity



Native Application Glue

- ▶ Part of the Android NDK platform code
- ▶ Handles application context
- ▶ Calls user main
- ▶ Defines looper listening for events



Native App Glue Stores Context

```
void ANativeActivity_onCreate(ANativeActivity* activity, void* savedState, size_t savedStateSize) {
    LOGV("Creating: %p", activity);

    activity->callbacks->onConfigurationChanged = onConfigurationChanged;
    activity->callbacks->onContentRectChanged = onContentRectChanged;
    activity->callbacks->onDestroy = onDestroy;
    activity->callbacks->onInputQueueCreated = onInputQueueCreated;
    activity->callbacks->onInputQueueDestroyed = onInputQueueDestroyed;
    activity->callbacks->onLowMemory = onLowMemory;
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowCreated = onNativeWindowCreated;
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowDestroyed = onNativeWindowDestroyed;
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowRedrawNeeded = onNativeWindowRedrawNeeded;
    activity->callbacks->onNativeWindowResized = onNativeWindowResized;
}
```

User code goes in `android_main()`



Hands On: Masking the Entrypoint



Removing Resource Files

- ▶ Optionally remove resources files
 - ▶ Android libraries
 - ▶ Assets
- ▶ Further reduces analysis surfaces




Can we remove the `AndroidManifest`?



Example Purely Native App

App: rawdrawandroid



Excellent, now we can draw malicious shapes!

Translating Java Methods to C++

The background features abstract geometric shapes in various shades of blue, including light blue, medium blue, and dark blue, arranged in a complex, overlapping pattern on the right side of the slide.

Standard differences between Java and C++

Java

```
private void printFibonacci(int N) {  
    int num1 = 0;  
    int num2 = 1;  
    int counter = 0;  
  
    while (counter < N) {  
        Log.d("Number", String.valueOf(num1));  
  
        // Calculate next  
        int num3 = num2 + num1;  
        num1 = num2;  
        num2 = num3;  
        counter++;  
    }  
}
```



C++

```
void printFibonacci(int N) {  
    int num1 = 0;  
    int num2 = 1;  
    int counter = 0;  
  
    while (counter < N) {  
        __android_log_print(ANDROID_LOG_DEBUG, "Number", "%d", num1);  
  
        // Calculate next  
        int num3 = num2 + num1;  
        num1 = num2;  
        num2 = num3;  
        counter++;  
    }  
}
```

We want to manipulate the device.

Android API Framework

- ▶ Library of APIs used by developers
- ▶ Callable classes, methods, and variables
- ▶ Interface to Android services and hardware



Using the JNI to Invoke Android APIs

- ▶ The Android framework is exposed in Java
- ▶ JNI is the bridge between Java and C++




Hands On: Translating Java to Native C++

The background of the slide is white with abstract blue geometric shapes. On the right side, there is a large, complex shape composed of several overlapping triangles and polygons in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to dark navy blue. A thin, light blue line extends from the bottom left towards the right, passing through the blue shapes.

JNI calls are easy to read / hook.

Further JNI Drawbacks

- ▶ Methods are commonly hooked with Frida
- ▶ Class names are plaintext strings
- ▶ Easy to reverse engineer



What if we want to be stealthier?

Hiding API Calls Via Binder



Case Study: Dialing a Phone


- ▶ Intents send the dial request
- ▶ Binder sends this to the TelephonyManager service
- ▶ TelephonyManager service handles event



Knowledge time: Exploring the Binder




Enables IPC and RPC in Android



Wrapped by many popular classes


- ▶ Intents
- ▶ Messengers
- ▶ ContentProviders
- ▶ Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL)



Can we bypass these common targets?

Let's dive even deeper


Implemented as a kernel driver



The screenshot displays the Android Code Search interface. At the top, there is a search bar with the text "Search for code or files". Below the search bar, the navigation path is shown: "kernel/superproject > common-android-mainline > common/drivers/android/binder.c". The main content area is split into two panes. The left pane, titled "Files", shows a directory tree with "binder.c" selected. The right pane, titled "binder.c", shows the source code for the file, with line numbers 112 through 131 visible. The code includes definitions for binder debug masks and a function to set the stop-on-user-error parameter.

```
112 BINDER_DEBUG_INTERNAL_REFS      = 1U << 12,  
113 BINDER_DEBUG_PRIORITY_CAP      = 1U << 13,  
114 BINDER_DEBUG_SPINLOCKS        = 1U << 14,  
115 };  
116 static uint32_t binder_debug_mask = BINDER_DEBUG_USER_ERROR |  
117     BINDER_DEBUG_FAILED_TRANSACTION | BINDER_DEBUG_DEAD_TRANSACTION;  
118 module_param_named(debug_mask, binder_debug_mask, uint, 0644);  
119  
120 char *binder_devices_param = CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_DEVICES;  
121 module_param_named(devices, binder_devices_param, charp, 0444);  
122  
123 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(binder_user_error_wait);  
124 static int binder_stop_on_user_error;  
125  
126 static int binder_set_stop_on_user_error(const char *val,  
127     const struct kernel_param *kp)  
128 {  
129     int ret;  
130  
131     ret = param_set_int(val, kp);
```

More Detailed Binder Architecture



Binder Invocation Backend

Binder allocates memory in target process

Process handles with `onTransact()`

Writes response back

Binder retrieves and returns response



Not required for non-IOCTL commands



We want to transact with existing services.

ServiceManager handles system services.

But we can't use ServiceManager ☹️

Cannot resolve symbol

```
import android.os.IBinder;
import android.os.Parcel;
import android.os.ServiceManager;
2 usages
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {
    1 usage
    private void transactTelephonyService() {
        try {
            IBinder binder = ServiceManager.getService
```

It's hidden and limited to system use

```
▼ > frameworks/base/core/java/android/os/ServiceManager.java

ServiceManager.java
34 * declared statically on an Android device (SELinux access_v
35 * names in service_contexts files), and they do not follow t
36 * building applications, android.app.Service should be pref
37 *
38 * @hide
39 **/
40 @SystemApi(client = SystemApi.Client.MODULE_LIBRARIES)
41 public final class ServiceManager {
42     private static final String TAG = "ServiceManager";
43     private static final Object sLock = new Object();
44
45     @UnsupportedAppUsage
46     private static IServiceManager sServiceManager;
47
```



Or is it?

Reflection doesn't respect hidden APIs lol

No more errors!

```
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {  
  
    1 usage  
    private String transactTelephonyService() {  
        String result = "";  
        Method getService = null;  
        IBinder binder = null;  
        Parcel data = null;  
        Parcel reply = null;  
  
        try {  
            getService = Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager").getMethod("getService", String.class);  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Reflection

Hands On: Finding Callable Services



Bound Invokable services

ActivityManagerService

LocationManager

PackageManagerService

TelephonyManager

SensorService

WifiManagerNotificationManager

AudioManager

PowerManagerWindowManager

ClipboardServiceInputMethodManager

AlarmManagerBatteryManager

StorageManagerConnectivityManager


BluetoothManagerVibratorService

UserManager

AccessibilityManager

Use Parcel objects to transmit data

- ▶ Container for messages
- ▶ Requires target interface
- ▶ Must write method arguments



Call `transact()` to communicate

- ▶ Transmits the message
- ▶ Receives the response via another Parcel
- ▶ Requires method code instead of name



Hands On: Invoking dial via Binder



We need to do this in C++.

I won't make you
translate it all.



Phew!

We already know native translation

```
// Binder calling
jclass serviceManagerClass = env->FindClass("android/os/ServiceManager");
jmethodID getServiceMethodID = env->GetStaticMethodID(serviceManagerClass, "getService",
    "(Ljava/lang/String;)Landroid/os/IBinder;");

jstring serviceName = env->NewStringUTF("phone");
jobject binder = env->CallStaticObjectMethod(serviceManagerClass, getServiceMethodID, serviceName);

// Make the transaction
jclass iBinderClass = env->FindClass("android/os/IBinder");
jmethodID transactMethodID = env->GetMethodID(iBinderClass, "transact", "(ILandroid/os/Parcel;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)Z");
env->CallBooleanMethod(binder, transactMethodID, 1, dataParcel, replyParcel, 0);
}
```

The background features abstract, overlapping geometric shapes in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to deep navy blue. The shapes are primarily triangles and polygons, creating a dynamic, layered effect. The text is positioned on the left side of the slide, set against the white background.


Hands On: Examining our Final Purely Native App

Test time!



Encrypt class strings for further protection

- ▶ Encrypt string targets of reflective calls
- ▶ Avoid plaintext
 - ▶ Target services
 - ▶ Target class names



Summarizing Our Obfuscation

The background features abstract, overlapping geometric shapes in various shades of blue, ranging from light sky blue to deep navy blue. The shapes are primarily triangles and polygons, creating a dynamic, layered effect. A thin, light blue line extends from the bottom right towards the center of the page.


Purely Native Code

- ▶ Masks the entrypoint
- ▶ No pretty Java code
- ▶ Challenges automated and human analysts




Direct Binder Invocation

- ▶ Use for system service calls
- ▶ Entirely avoids method names
- ▶ Bypasses hooks



Will we see this more?


It's hard to write lol



Thank you!



Bonus Section



References



- ▶ Presentation details
- ▶ Supporting code
- ▶ LaurieWired TROOPERS23 Github Repo
 - ▶ https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative_Troopers23

Android Native Code Resources

- ▶ Sample: native-activity
 - ▶ https://developer.android.com/ndk/samples/sample_na
- ▶ Android framework NativeActivity class
 - ▶ <https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base.git/+/master/core/java/android/app/NativeActivity.java>
- ▶ Rawdrawandroid
 - ▶ <https://github.com/cnlohr/rawdrawandroid>

Java Native Interface (JNI)

- ▶ [JNI Functions](#)
- ▶ [JNI Types and Signatures](#)



Binder

- ▶ Documentation

- ▶ <https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Binder>

- ▶ Source code


- ▶ <https://cs.android.com/android/kernel/superproject/+common-android-mainline:common/drivers/android/binder.c>

SystemManager

- ▶ Source code

- ▶ <https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:frameworks/base/core/java/android/os/ServiceManager.java>

Native App Structure



We can use NativeActivity as main


Entrypoint

User code library

```
<activity android:name="android.app.NativeActivity" android:label="@string/app_name"
  android:configChanges="orientation|keyboardHidden">
  <meta-data android:name="android.app.lib_name" android:value="native-activity" />
  <intent-filter>
  <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
  <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
  </intent-filter>
</activity>
```


Define Obfuscation

- ▶ Obfuscation obscures app data and functionality
- ▶ Essential for Android
- ▶ Decompiled into pretty Java code



Native Code in Android


- ▶ Implemented as Linux ELF binaries
- ▶ Shared object (.so) files
- ▶ Compiled to run on particular instruction set architectures



```
rawtest.apk
├── Source code
├── Resources
│   ├── assets
│   ├── lib
│   │   ├── arm64-v8a
│   │   │   └── librawtest.so
│   │   ├── armeabi-v7a
│   │   ├── x86
│   │   └── x86_64
│   ├── META-INF
│   ├── res
│   │   ├── mipmap
│   │   └── AndroidManifest.xml
│   ├── resources.arsc
│   └── APK signature
└── Summary
```

Standard Entrypoint Recognition

Java entrypoint



The screenshot shows an IDE window with two tabs: 'AndroidManifest.xml' and 'main'. The 'main' tab is active, displaying the following XML code:

```
68         </intent-filter>
69     </service>
70     <activity android:label="GameHub" android:name="app.retrofit.android.main"
71         <intent-filter>
72             <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
73             <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
74         </intent-filter>
75     </activity>
76     <service android:name="app.retrofit.android.receiver"/>
77     <receiver android:name="app.retrofit.android.receiver.receiver_BR"
78         <intent-filter>
79             <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED"/>
80         </intent-filter>
81     <intent-filter>
82         <action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED"/>
```

The IDE's left sidebar shows a project tree with the following structure:

- Source code
 - android.support.v4
 - androidx
 - anywheresoftware
 - app.retrofit.android
 - designerscripts
 - firebasemessaging
 - httpjob
 - httputils2service
 - main
 - Manifest
 - R
 - receiver
 - starter
 - b4a
 - com

Java implementation

Android NDK

- ▶ NDK stands for Native Development Kit
- ▶ Contains tools for writing C/C++ code in Android



NativeActivity

- ▶ Runs in the main app thread
- ▶ Managed code entrypoint
- ▶ Sets up and loads user native library



Minimal Native APK

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
2 <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" package="com.app.rawtest"
  platformBuildVersionName="7">
3   <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="30" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
4   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_RELEASE_APP"/>
5   <application android:label="rawtest" android:icon="@mipmap/icon" android:hasCode="false" an
6   <activity android:label="rawtest" android:name="android.app.NativeActivity" android:con
7   <meta-data android:name="android.app.lib_name" android:value="rawtest"/>
8   <intent-filter>
9     <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
10    <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
11  </intent-filter>
12 </activity>
13 </application>
14 </manifest>
```

Defined entrypoint

No such class!

Java Method

```
private String getPhoneNumber() {
    TelephonyManager telephonyManager =
        (TelephonyManager) this.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
    if (ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this,
        Manifest.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED &&
        ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this,
            Manifest.permission.READ_SMS) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED &&
        ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this,
            Manifest.permission.READ_PHONE_NUMBERS) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {

        String phoneNumber = telephonyManager.getLine1Number();
        Log.d("LAURIE", "Printing number");
        Log.d("LAURIE", phoneNumber);
    }
}
```


Equivalent C++ Method (fix picture)

```
JNIEXPORT jstring JNICALL
Java_com_example_calltelephony_MainActivity_getPhoneNumber(JNIEnv *env, jobject MainActivity obj) {
    jclass contextClass = env->FindClass( name: "android/content/Context");

    // Get getSystemService method
    jmethodID getSystemService = env->GetMethodID( clazz: contextClass, name: "getSystemService", sig: "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Object;");

    // Get TELEPHONY_SERVICE
    jfieldID telephonyServiceField = env->GetStaticFieldID( clazz: contextClass, name: "TELEPHONY_SERVICE", sig: "Ljava/lang/String;");
    jstring telephonyService = (jstring) env->GetStaticObjectField( clazz: contextClass, fieldID: telephonyServiceField);

    jobject telephonyManager = env->CallObjectMethod(obj, methodID: getSystemService, telephonyService);

    // Get TelephonyManager class
    jclass telephonyManagerClass = env->FindClass( name: "android/telephony/TelephonyManager");

    // Get getLine1Number method
    jmethodID getLine1Number = env->GetMethodID( clazz: telephonyManagerClass, name: "getLine1Number", sig: "()Ljava/lang/String;");
```


Let's make the first line look more like the second.

```
jmethodID dialNumberID = env->GetMethodID(clazz, "dialNumber", "(Ljava/lang/String;)V");  
env->CallVoidMethod(instance, dialNumberID, "12345678");
```



```
jmethodID transactMethodID = env->GetMethodID(iBinderClass, "transact", "(ILandroid/os/Parcel;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)Z");  
env->CallBooleanMethod(binder, transactMethodID, 1, dataParcel, replyParcel, 0);
```

Binding to System Services with ServiceManager

- ▶ Returns Binder object for target service
- ▶ Manages system services
- ▶ Limited to system usage



Simple Java Transaction Example

System interface

```
getService = Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager").getMethod("getService", String.class);
binder = (IBinder) getService.invoke(null, "phone");

data = Parcel.obtain();
reply = Parcel.obtain();

data.writeInterfaceToken("com.android.internal.telephony.ITelephony");
data.writeString("12345678"); // add the phone number argument

binder.transact(1, data, reply, 0);
reply.readException();
```

Method code

Service Constant Mappings

TELEPHONY_SERVICE = "phone";

TELECOM_SERVICE = "telecom";

CARRIER_CONFIG_SERVICE = "carrier_config";

EUICC_SERVICE = "euicc";

EUICC_CARD_SERVICE = "euicc_card";

MMS_SERVICE = "mms";

CLIPBOARD_SERVICE = "clipboard";

TEXT_CLASSIFICATION_SERVICE = "textclassification";

SELECTION_TOOLBAR_SERVICE = "selection_toolbar";

FONT_SERVICE = "font";

ATTENTION_SERVICE = "attention";

ROTATION_RESOLVER_SERVICE = "resolver";

Resulting Code in Ghidra

```
uVar4 = _JNIEnv::GetStaticMethodID
        (param_1,p_Var1,"getService","(Ljava/lang/String;)Landroid/os/IBinder;");
uVar5 = _JNIEnv::NewStringUTF(param_1,"phone");
p_Var6 = (_jmethodID *)
        _JNIEnv::CallStaticObjectMethod((_jclass *)param_1,(_jmethodID *)p_Var1,uVar4,uVar5);
p_Var1 = (_jclass *)_JNIEnv::FindClass(param_1,"android/os/IBinder");
uVar4 = _JNIEnv::GetMethodID
        (param_1,p_Var1,"transact","(ILandroid/os/Parcel;Landroid/os/Parcel;I)Z");
_JNIEnv::CallBooleanMethod((_jobject *)param_1,p_Var6,uVar4,1,p_Var3,uVar2,0);
pcVar7 = (char *)FUN_000219fe(abStack_20);
uVar2 = _JNIEnv::NewStringUTF(param_1,pcVar7);
```

???