


Building Zero Trust Architecture in Public Health

Gesundheitsamt Frankfurt am Main, cronn, ERNW

26/06/2025 – TROOPERS Heidelberg



InfoSec
**IMPACT
AWARD**



Das Digitalisierungspaket
der Zukunft →

GA-Lotse

Cooperation:



HESSEN



Hessisches Ministerium
für Familie, Senioren, Sport,
Gesundheit und Pflege



Funded by
the European Union
NextGenerationEU

Agenda

1. Introduction & Project Context
2. GA-Lotse Architecture and Zero Trust
3. Secure Software Development Life-cycle
4. Implementation & Testing
5. Conclusion

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Introduction



Bianca Kastl
Gesundheitsamt Frankfurt
Product Owner “GA-Lotse”



Sven Nobis
ERNW Enno Rey Netzwerke GmbH
Security Consulting



Benedikt Waldvogel
cronn GmbH
Lead Software Architect



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Project Context and Challenges

- Usually data with a high to very high protection level (Art. 9 GDPR)
- Most of the time Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
- Sometimes anonymous data because of discrimination risk (HIV)
- Sometimes even more secured data (socio-psychiatric service)

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- Learnings from the pandemic
 - IT and workplace has to be more flexible
 - Remote and mobile work becomes more important
- Zero Trust a new security paradigm that enables a modern workplace



Anmeldung mit Passkey

Anmelden mit Passkey

- Entire project is funded by public money with around 23 million Euro
 - Funding requirements enforce high bar of data protection and security
 - 15% of the budget must be assigned to security and data protection
- Great opportunity to do security the right way from the start

Guiding Principles


- Security by Design and Default (not just as a buzzword)
 - Dedicated security team for the entire project
 - Dedicated testing team on top of team internal testing
- Privacy by Design (not just as a buzzword)
- Open Source from the beginning

Cooperation:


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Team Structure

9 Business module teams



Cross sectional teams



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
Zero Trust Definition

- Minimal privileges – “never trust, always verify”
- There is no “safe environment” anymore
- “Assume Breach”
 - A breach at some time is unavoidable – design systems with a small “blast radius”

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
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Zero Trust Architecture – Segmentation Into Tenants




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Zero Trust Architecture – Segmentation Into Modules




Cooperation:

Zero Trust Architecture – Service Mesh (SPATZ)



Cooperation:

Policy Decision & Enforcements Points




Cooperation:

Security in the Software Development Process

- How did we **get to** this secure **architecture**?
- How did we **ensure** that ...
 - ...the **design** has no flaws?
 - ...the **implementation** of this architecture **is secure and accurate**?
- And when should it be done in the development process?
- And finally, what **challenges** did we have?

Cooperation:

Secure Software Development Life Cycle (SSDLC)




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Secure Software Development Life Cycle

→ Secure by Design




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Software Architecture (Recap)

- Microservices
- Kubernetes
- REST / mTLS



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Team Autonomy



Dilemma: Autonomy vs.
Centralisation

“9 teams develop

9 solutions

for 1 problem”



Regular consultation
between tech leads

Learning:

Enforce rules using ArchUnit!



“hybrid” microservice
architecture

Why?


Reusability!

Unified Tech Stack

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Tech Stack



Cooperation:

Choosing the Tech Stack

- Security is only one piece of the puzzle
 - We often fixate on CVEs, but library without maintainers is an equal risk!
- Maintenance & Community
 - Who's behind it? Vendor-backed or volunteer?
 - Is it alive? Release cadence, open PRs/issues, roadmap
 - How long does it exist?
- *Example:* Spring Boot (enterprise stability) vs Next.js (rapid-iterations)
- Developer Experience (DX) often drives decisions

Cooperation:

Developer Plans vs Privacy Demands

Me (developer)


“Cool: Spring + Hibernate + a DB.
Lets slam in those school entry examinations.
We store person references, how hard can it be? 💪”

Bianca

“Whoa there... remember **‘Privacy by Design’**:
We don’t store anything that lets us actually identify the kiddos 🙅”

Cooperation:

Secure Software Development Life Cycle → Privacy by Design



Cooperation:

Privacy by Design: Implementation Challenges (1)

● Case Study: Central File

| Base Module | | |
|-------------|-----------|----------|
| ID | Firstname | Lastname |
| 1 | Maria | Schmidt |
| 2 | Robert | Schmidt |
| 3 | Emma | Schmidt |
| 4 | Toni | Schmidt |

| School Entry Module | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|----------|------------|-------------|----------------------|
| Child ID | Parent 1 | Parent 2 | Height [m] | Weight [kg] | Language Proficiency |
| 3 | 1 | 2 | 1,15 | 20,5 | Excellent |
| 4 | 1 | 2 | 1,20 | 24,3 | Good |



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Privacy by Design: Implementation Challenges (2)

- Case specific IDs

| Base Module | | | | | School Entry Module | | | | |
|-------------|-----------|----------|-----------|---------|---------------------|----------|----------|------------|-------|
| ID | Firstname | Lastname | Person ID | Case ID | Child ID | Parent 1 | Parent 2 | Height [m] | [...] |
| 6d28 | Maria | Schmidt | 6d28 | a186 | | | | | |
| | | | 6d28 | 514d | | | | | |
| 529e | Robert | Schmidt | 529e | 32f6 | | | | | |
| | | | 529e | ea59 | | | | | |
| 91e9 | Emma | Schmidt | 91e9 | b920 | | | | | |
| | | | 91e9 | b920 | | | | | |
| 1762 | Toni | Schmidt | 1762 | d514 | | | | | |
| | | | 1762 | d514 | | | | | |
| | | | | | b920 | a186 | 32f6 | 1,15 | ... |
| | | | | | d514 | 514d | ea59 | 1,20 | ... |



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Privacy by Design: Implementation Challenges (3)


- Zero Trust
 - Attacker with access to school entry DB cannot correlate to real persons
- No (local) DB JOINS!
 - Remote JOINS via REST requests
 - Bulk Processing
- Must be implemented from day one

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Secure Software Development Life Cycle

→ Threat Modeling



Cooperation:


Threat Modeling 101

- High-level goal: Get a common understanding of the IT security threats in GA-Lotse
- Step 1: Evaluate the threats
 - “What can go wrong?” → threats
 - Use case approach: What can a malicious actor do?
- Step 2: Try to mitigate the risks
 - “What are we going to do about it?”
→ Security by Design, implementation
- Step 3: Are the mitigations effective?
 - “Did we do a good enough job?”
→ Code review, security testing: Pentests, security test cases
- *No goal*: domain-agnostic threats (e.g., SQLi, XSS)
 - Focus is of our TM workshop was: domain-specific threats

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Threat Model in GA-Lotse


- High-Level Threat Model
 - Using STRIDE
- Use Case Threat Model
 - Use Case 😊 → Abuse Case 😈
 - Case Study: School Entry



Cooperation:

Case Study: School Entry

Background: Use Cases (Simplified)



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Case Study: Self-Anamnesis

Abuse Cases

Domain-Specific Threats

- #1 Attacker finds the invitation envelope in the trash. They use the QR code to access the information provided by the citizen.
 - Mitigation #1: API accepts anamnesis data but does not reveal any data
 - Mitigation #2: Birthday as a second factor (more secure 2nd factors were discussed by not feasible)
- #2 Attacker has access to the citizen's device after they did the anamnesis.
 - ...
- #3 Attacker finds the invitation envelope in the trash. They use the QR code to manipulate data.
 - ...
- ...


Domain-Agnostic Threats

- Spoofing
 - Brute forcing
 - Session stealing
- Tampering
 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
 - Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
 - SQL-Injection, *-Injection
- Repudiation
 - ...
- Information disclosure
 - ...

Cooperation:

Secure Software Development Life Cycle


→ Secure by Design



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Testing Approach


- Strong focus on integration tests: Test services together, not in isolation
- Gradle-driven automation: Build & launch required services per test run
- Backend: JUnit integration tests via REST APIs
- End-to-end tests: Playwright drives a real browser against the UI



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Testing Trophy Instead of Pyramid

- Many **integration tests**
 - **720** E2E test scenarios
 - **10 000** backend integration tests
- Some **unit tests** & static checks
- Few **component tests**
- (Almost) **no mocking**
- **Why?**
 - Spring service/component tests are maintenance nightmare during refactorings



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Testing: Validation Files

- Aka Snapshot Testing
- Reveals unintended side-effects
- Good fit for security tests

```
@Test
void testNotAuthenticated() {
    CreateProcedureRequest request = new CreateProcedureRequest(...);

    ResponseEntity<String> response =
        restTemplate.postForEntity("/school-entries", request, String.class);

    assertThat(response.getStatusCode()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED);
    assertHeadersWithFile(response);
}
```

data/test/validation/testNotAuthenticated_headers.txt

```
Cache-Control: [no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate]
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: [same-origin]
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: [same-origin]
Expires: [0]
Pragma: [no-cache]
Strict-Transport-Security: [max-age=31536000 ; includeSubDomains]
Transfer-Encoding: [chunked]
WWW-Authenticate: [Bearer]
X-Content-Type-Options: [nosniff]
X-Frame-Options: [DENY]
```

Cooperation:

Security Testing (1)

```
@Test
void testLogin() {
    HttpCookie sessionIdCookie =
        loginAndAssertResponsesWithValidationFile("/some-path");
    assertRedisSessionStateWithFile(sessionIdCookie);
}
```

data/test/validation/testLogin_initialRedirect.txt

Cache-Control: [no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate]
Content-Length: [0]
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: [same-origin]
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: [same-origin]
Expires: [0]
Location: [<https://upstream-host:12345/auth/keycloak>]
Pragma: [no-cache]
Set-Cookie: [SESSION=[MASKED]; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly;
SameSite=Lax]
Strict-Transport-Security: [max-age=31536000 ; includeSubDomains]

Security Testing (2)

```
class SchoolEntryAuthorizationTest extends AbstractSpringBootTest implements AuthorizationTestTraits {  
    @Autowired  
    @Qualifier(AuthorizationTestUtil.REQUEST_MAPPING_HANDLER_MAPPING_BEAN_NAME)  
    private RequestMappingHandlerMapping requestMapping;  
  
    @Test  
    void testEndpointAuthorization() {  
        testEndpointAuthorization(testRestTemplate, requestMapping);  
    }  
}
```


Spring MVC Bean

data/test/validation/testEndpointAuthorization.md

| METHOD | URL | ALLOWED_ROLES |
|--------|---|---|
| DELETE | /appointment-blocks/1 | SCHOOL_ENTRY_ADMIN |
| GET | /appointment-blocks/appointment-block-groups | PROCEDURE_ARCHIVE SCHOOL_ENTRY_ADMIN |
| POST | /appointment-blocks/daily-appointment-block-groups | SCHOOL_ENTRY_ADMIN |
| POST | /appointment-blocks/daily-appointment-block-groups/validate | SCHOOL_ENTRY_ADMIN |
| [...] | | |

Cooperation:

Secure Software Development Life Cycle



Cooperation:

Conclusion

- Creating better and more secure products is possible through a consistent Shift left approach and Zero Trust
- Security problems that are found late in the project are very expensive

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<https://gitlab.opencode.de/ga-lotse>

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