

Getting Developers to Follow Standards is Easy and Other Lies We Tell Ourselves

TROOPERS 2025

whoami



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The backstory



Deprecating NTLM is Easy and Other Lies We Tell Ourselves

Steve Syfuhs
Principal Engineer



Nestori Syynimaa



BLUEHAT

SECURITY ABOVE ALL ELSE

Deprecating Azure AD Graph API is Easy and Other Lies We Tell Ourselves

Dr. Nestori Syynimaa

nOAuth

Disclosed by Omer Cohen of Descope on June 20th, 2023


Vulnerability in apps using OpenID Connect with Entra ID


Vulnerability is rooted in identity **anti-patterns** for OIDC

Vulnerable applications allow for **takeover (impersonation) of any user** in the application if you know the target email address

Cross-IdP attack

Timeline





Potential Risk of Privilege Escalation in Azure AD Applications

[MSRC](#) / By [MSRC](#) / June 20, 2023 / 3 min read

Summary

Microsoft has developed mitigations for an insecure [anti-pattern](#) used in Azure AD (AAD) applications highlighted by Descope, and reported to Microsoft, where use of the email claim from access tokens for authorization can lead to an escalation of privilege. An attacker can falsify the email claim in tokens issued to applications. Additionally, the threat of data leakage exists if applications use such claims for email lookup.

Microsoft recommends **never** using the email claim for authorization purposes. If your application uses the email claim for authorization or primary user identification purposes, it is subject to account and privilege escalation attacks.

Developers should review the authorization business logic of their applications and follow the guidance outlined below to protect applications from unauthorized access. We additionally encourage all developers to follow these Microsoft identity platform [best practices](#) for token validation. If you use third party applications, i.e., ones which you are not the developer, we encourage you to ensure your vendors are adhering to these best practices also.

We recommend reviewing your application's source code and ensuring emails are not used for primary user identification or authorization. Please use [the following migration guidance](#) if your application uses either of these insecure patterns to eliminate the risk of account escalation attacks.

Customer Impact

Microsoft has identified several multi-tenant applications with users that use an email address with an unverified domain owner. Although unverified email addresses do not pose a risk to applications that do not utilize email claims for authorization purposes, these application owners have been notified and were provided with guidance on how to modify their applications, if applicable. If you did not receive a notification, your application has not consumed email claims with unverified domain owners. To protect customers and applications that may be vulnerable to privilege escalation, Microsoft has deployed mitigations to omit token claims from unverified domain owners for most applications.

Potential Risk of Privilege Escalation in Azure AD Applications

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The Hacker News

Critical 'nOAuth' Flaw in Microsoft Azure AD Enabled Complete Account Takeover

📅 Jun 21, 2023 👤 Ravie Lakshmanan

Authentication / Vulnerability

A security shortcoming in Microsoft Azure Active Directory (AD) Open Authorization ([OAuth](#)) process could have been exploited to achieve full account takeover, researchers said.

BLEEPINGCOMPUTER

Microsoft fixes Azure AD auth flaw enabling account takeover

By [Sergiu Gatlan](#)

📅 June 20, 2023 ⌚ 12:38 PM 💬 0

Microsoft has addressed an Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) authentication flaw that could allow threat actors to escalate privileges and potentially fully take over the target's account.

Microsoft Patches Critical 'nOAuth' Flaw in Azure AD Apps

Microsoft has [patched a new security vulnerability](#) that was discovered in some applications leveraging [Azure Active Directory](#) (recently renamed [Microsoft Entra ID](#)). The authentication bypass flaw could allow threat actors to completely take over the victim's account.



The NOAuth “Flaw” Is A Symptom Of Industry Anti-Patterns

Eric Woodruff

And as it goes whenever there is a security problem, someone must fall on the sword. In this case Microsoft is taking the hit; unfortunately most new articles are incorrectly reporting on this as an Azure AD “flaw” that Microsoft had to “fix”. Kudos to Kurt Mackie (@kurmac) at Redmond Mag for being the only article to accurately report on this problem, which you can find here, [Microsoft](#)


Timeline

June 2023
nOAuth declared “fixed”

Today

July 11th, 2023
Storm-0558 Incident

June 20th, 2023
Descope disclosed nOAuth




New research into nOAuth

GOOD NEWS EVERYONE

n0Auth

I'M NOT DEAD.


Descope focus



1. Legitimate user authenticates with Google
2. Attacker configures attack Entra tenant
3. Attacker authenticates with Entra with unverified email attribute
4. Application account merge logic does not verify email ownership
5. Attacker overtakes account with a cross-IdP type attack

Using Adobe as an example, it is not vulnerable to nOAuth

Descope focus



Descope focus



Your verification code is:

912965

Your account can't be accessed
even if you didn't submit this request.

To keep your account secure,
password for your Adobe account.
Access app to sign in. Adobe's
authentication makes signing in
needing to remember or change

[Learn more](#) and download the




Your Apple account is now connected to your Adobe account
and may be used for sign in. You can disconnect it or add
another from your [Adobe Account](#).


If you did not request that these accounts be connected,
please [contact us immediately](#).

Thanks,
Adobe


Descope focus



Descope focus




Building on Descopes research



1. Legitimate user authenticates with Entra
2. Attacker configures attack Entra tenant
3. Attacker authenticates with Entra with unverified email attribute
4. Application is not following OpenID Connect standards
5. Attacker overtakes account with a **cross-tenant** type attack

Using Adobe as an example, it is not vulnerable to nOAuth

Building on Descopes research




1. Legitimate user authenticates with Entra
2. Attacker configures attack Entra tenant
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Using Adobe as an example, it is not vulnerable to nOAuth


The Cross-tenant attack problem


App registrations and service principals




App registrations and service principals

 Fabrikam tenant (Consumer)

 Service principal
Contoso.com SaaS App



A screenshot of a web browser window showing the 'Contoso SaaS App Sign-in' page. The browser's address bar displays 'https://www.contoso.com'. The page has a title 'Contoso SaaS App Sign-in'. Below the title, there are two input fields: 'Username' and 'Password'. Below these fields is the word 'or'. At the bottom of the sign-in section, there is a button labeled 'Sign in with Microsoft' with the Microsoft logo icon.

 Contoso tenant (ISV)

 App registration
Contoso.com SaaS App

App registrations and service principals

Service principal

Security principal in consuming tenant

Customer consents to app on first use

Enables AuthN/AuthZ



Fabrikam tenant (Consumer)



Service principal
Contoso.com SaaS App

App registration

Defines what the developer needs

Public or confidential client

Redirect URIs


Claims



Contoso tenant (ISV)




App registration
Contoso.com SaaS App




Multi-tenant OAuth / OIDC endpoints

Common Endpoints Enabled multi-tenant applications


<https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/authorize>
<https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token>




Following the OpenID Connect spec




nOAuth vulnerable app



Abusing a nOAuth vulnerable app



Setting an unverified email addresses




Other methods for setting unverified email address


Convert guest invite to member

Hybrid synced user

Examining claims with jwt.ms

Abusing a nOAuth vulnerable app





You're browsing as a guest

As a guest, your browsing data is kept separate from the profiles on this device. Here's what happens when you close all windows you browsed as a guest:


Microsoft Edge **won't save:**

- Your browsing history
- Your download history
- Cookies and site data

Microsoft Edge **will save:**

- Files you download

Abusing a nOAuth vulnerable app



Microsoft mitigating controls

Concept of verified and unverified domains

```
{
  "typ": "JWT",
  "alg": "RS256",
  "kid": "YTce05I3yyqR6jz0S51Abpe42Jw"
}, {
  "aud": "cb3ece00-7fca-4b1e-956c-clf24f2f5360",
  "iss": "https://login.microsoftonline.com/dd240f35-22cd-4617-9b9b-24ae1343f53d/v2.0",
  "exp": 1737489178,
  "aio": "AWQAm/8ZAAAA/",
  "cc": "CqEAFh1MzV1eDQzWzgwMjE1Lm9u:",
  "email": "eric@fabrikam.com",
  "notice": "123",
  "rh": "1.AXEBNQ8k3c0iF0abmySuE0P1PQD0PsvKfx5L1WzB8k8vU2BxAVBxAQ.",
  "sub": "BGyJx677G2J1wo-ceoduAu8IKyeadOf_rZPKgD-BuQ",
  "tid": "dd240f35-22cd-4617-9b9b-24ae1343f53d",
  "uti": "P0190_OFGkqt29gf0ZHjAQ",
  "ver": "2.0"
}, { "Signature":
```

Evil tenant

 Service principal
Contoso.com SaaS App

User: Eric
Mail: eric@fabrikam.com
UPN: eric@evil.cloud

Unverified

Fabrikam tenant (Consumer)

 Service principal
Contoso.com SaaS App

User: Eric
Mail: eric@fabrikam.com

Verified


App registrations created **after** June 2023 by default have

```
removeUnverifiedEmailClaim: true
```

Contoso tenant (ISV)

App registration
Contoso.com SaaS App

Microsoft mitigation bypasses



Researching the Entra Gallery

Microsoft Entra admin center

Search resources, services, and docs (G+)

Copilot

admin@M365x8837083...
CONTOSO (M365X88370830.ON...

Home

What's new

Diagnose & solve problems

Favorites

Identity

Overview

Users

All users

Deleted users

User settings

Groups

Devices

Applications

Enterprise applications

App registrations

Protection

Identity Governance

External Identities

Show more

Protection

Identity Governance

Learn & support

Browse Microsoft Entra Gallery > App registrations > jwt > App registrations > jwt > App registrations > jwt.ms > App registrations > jwt.ms > App registrations > jwt > Enterprise applications | All applications >

Browse Microsoft Entra Gallery

Create your own application | Got feedback?

The Microsoft Entra App Gallery is a catalog of thousands of apps that make it easy to deploy and configure single sign-on (SSO) and automated user provisioning. When deploying an app from the App Gallery, you leverage prebuilt templates to connect your users more securely to their apps. Browse or create your own application here. If you are wanting to publish an application you have developed into the Microsoft Entra Gallery for other organizations to discover and use, you can file a request using the process described in [this article](#).

Search application

Single Sign-on : OpenID Connect

User Account Management : All

Categories : All

Federated SSO

Provisioning

Showing 50 of 1018 results

3P Learning Mathletics

3P Learning Ltd

3Shape Account

3Shape A/S

40SEAS

40Seas

4ward365

4ward365

9ine Platform

9ine Consulting

ABa Customer

ABa Quality Monitoring Ltd

ABa Reporting

ABa Quality Monitoring Ltd

Abacus.AI

Abacus.AI

Abibot Netlogistik

NETLOGISTIK S.A. DE C.V.

Acra

Asir Inc

Actionspace for Office 365

Actionspace

AdaptiveWork OAuth App

Planview, Inc.

AdL

Big Bang System

Adobe Identity Management (OIDC)

Adobe

ADP (OIDC)

ADP Inc

AeyeScan

Aeye Security Lab Inc.

AgilePoint NX

AgilePoint, Inc.

AI2

TMTI Limited

AiChat

AiChat

AIDA Healthcare SSO

AIDA Healthcare

AiDEA

AIS Service Catalog

Akari Virtual Assistant


Alaya

Albert

Search


9:39 PM
6/18/2025

Microsoft Entra Gallery



¹1017 OIDC applications at time of research, Fall 2024


Microsoft Entra Gallery



How many applications are vulnerable?

- Nobody can really know
- It's probably more than 10
- Microsoft should know how many apps consuming using unverified email claim
- Consumption != vulnerable

Timeline




The nine applications

The applications

- HRMS (human resources) platform with PII
- Redacted platform with PII
- Three knowledge sharing/collaboration platforms
- Redacted platform with 45,000+ customers (vendor claimed)
- Business coaching platform with O365 integration
- Construction site management platform
- Meeting scheduling platform with O365 integration

The application vendor response

Timeline




Application vendor response

- Quickest resolution was within one week
- Longest resolution is still ongoing
- Variation in how easy it was to report the problem
- Variation in how the vendor responded, if at all
- Some systems appear to have removed Entra integration
- Some systems have put up a paywall that prohibits testing


The MSRC Case

MSRC Case




Defense and Mitigation


Mitigation and defense: Customer side




Mitigation and defense: Customer side




Mitigation and defense: Customer side



Mitigation and defense: Customer side



Detection: customer side



Detection: customer side log correlation

Entra Sign-in	Time	App Sign-in	Time
eric@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T14:05	eric@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T14:05
bill@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T15:03	bill@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T15:03
		eric@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T15:04
melissa@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T16:30	melissa@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T16:30

Work


https://www.contoso.com

Contoso SaaS App Sign-in

Username

Password

or

 Sign in with Microsoft

Fabrikam tenant (Consumer)

 Service principal
Contoso.com SaaS App

 User: Eric
Mail: eric@fabrikam.com

Detection: customer side log correlation

Entra Sign-in	Time	App Sign
eric@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T14:05	
bill@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T15:03	
	2025-06-11T15:04	
melissa@fabrikam.cloud	2025-06-11T16:30	

Next to impossible

Work

https://www.contoso.com

Contoso SaaS App Sign-in

Username


Password


or


 Sign in with Microsoft

**Fabrikam tenant (Consumer)**

 Service principal
Contoso.com SaaS App

 User: Eric
Mail: eric@fabrikam.com

**Contoso tenant (ISV)**

 App registration
Contoso.com SaaS App

Mitigation: Vendor / developer side

Fix your application

Check app reg for removeUnverifiedEmailClaim

Test your application

Test your application

Fix your application

Test your application

Fix your application

Test your application

removeUnverifiedEmailClaim

Graph Explorer



Tenant
Fabrikam



EW

GET

v1.0

https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/ca1f55de-ba90-4978-88a5-d27337790f50/authenticationBehaviors



Run query

No resource was found matching this query

Request Body



Request Headers



Modify Permissions



Access token

OK - 200 - 246 ms

Response preview



Response headers



Code snippets



Toolkit component



Adaptive cards

```
{
  "@odata.context": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/$metadata#applications('ca1f55de-ba90-4978-88a5-d27337790f50')/authenticationBehaviors",
  "removeUnverifiedEmailClaim": false
}
```



Search



1:36 PM
6/28/2025

removeUnverifiedEmailClaim

Graph Explorer



Tenant
Fabrikam



EW

PATCH

v1.0

https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/ca1f55de-ba90-4978-88a5-d27337790f50/authenticationBehaviors



Run query

No resource was found matching this query

Request Body



Request Headers



Modify Permissions



Access token

```
{
  "removeUnverifiedEmailClaim": true
}
```

✓ No Content - 204 - 1110 ms



Response preview



Response headers



Code snippets



Toolkit component



Adaptive cards



```
{}
```



Search



1:41 PM
6/28/2025

removeUnverifiedEmailClaim

Graph Explorer

Tenant
Fabrikam

GET

v1.0

https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/ca1f55de-ba90-4978-88a5-d27337790f50/authenticationBehaviors

Run query

No resource was found matching this query

Request Body

Request Headers

Modify Permissions

Access token

OK - 200 - 195 ms

Response preview

Response headers

Code snippets

Toolkit component

Adaptive cards

```
{
  "@odata.context": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/$metadata#applications('ca1f55de-ba90-4978-88a5-d27337790f50')/authenticationBehaviors",
  "removeUnverifiedEmailClaim": true
}
```



Search



1:41 PM
6/28/2025

removeUnverifiedEmailClaim

Graph Explorer



Tenant
Fabrikam



EW

GET

v1.0

https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/44018bc6-6332-435e-b466-756c92a8c1c1/authenticationBehaviors



Run query

No resource was found matching this query

Request Body



Request Headers



Modify Permissions



Access token

OK - 200 - 850 ms



Response preview



Response headers



Code snippets



Toolkit component



Adaptive cards



{}



Search



1:43 PM
6/28/2025

Userinfo endpoint

```
PowerShell
PS C:\> Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/oidc/userinfo" -Headers $headers -Method Get | fl

sub       : F-rgWUssyVOTgJupwF_cBAZw74tFZr7JwQ3c4lix0s
name      : Adele Vance
picture   : https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/photo/$value
email     : ericw@semperis.com Includes unverified email

PS C:\>
```

New nOAuth blog post

<https://sl.entra.ms/noauth>

Key takeaways

Key takeaways

nOAuth is extremely dangerous

nOAuth will continue to exist

Customers of vulnerable apps have no real protection

<https://sl.entra.ms/noauth>

Questions?



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