




Space Security 101: A Legal and Policy Primer for the IT Community

RITANSHU LOHANI

A deep space photograph showing a vast field of stars and galaxies against a black background. A single, very bright star with a prominent four-pointed diffraction pattern is centered in the upper half of the image. Numerous other stars of varying colors (yellow, orange, blue) and sizes are scattered throughout the frame. Some faint, distant galaxies are also visible.

WHO I AM? WHY AM I HERE?





Google Earth
Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy



ERASMUS MUNDUS JOINT MASTER
**International Law
of Global Security,
Peace and Development**





DISCLAIMER

This presentation is made in my personal capacity. The views expressed here are solely my own and do not reflect the positions or opinions of any institutions or organizations I am currently or have previously been affiliated with, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the United Nations.



WHY SPACE MATTERS?

Agriculture

Communication

Developing Economies

Disasters

Education

Environment and Climate Change

Global Health

Human Settlements

Transportation

Humanitarian Assistance

International Peace and Security


Research and Development

WHAT EVEN IS *SPACE SECURITY*?

Commonly understood to refer to measures designed to prevent deliberate harms to a space system, including its component parts, from intended or intentional threats undertaken by another actor.

Concerned with the relationship between space objects and the maintenance of international peace and security (mitigation and prevention of threats), as well as the work of States to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Discussions fall under the purview of the Conference on Disarmament, the UN General Assembly's First Committee, and the UN Disarmament Commission.






SPACE SECURITY $\neq$ SPACE SAFETY

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
**SPACE SECURITY + SPACE SAFETY = SPACE
SUSTAINABILITY**

TYPES OF ORBITS


LEO




MEO



GEO



SSO



SPACE SYSTEMS

Space Segment


- any object launched into orbit from the Earth, the Moon, or other celestial bodies to travel to, in or through outer space
- includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.
- Examples of space segment components are satellites and space launch vehicles.

Ground segment

- terrestrial part of a space system, which includes all the facilities and elements needed to operate a space object and deliver services to users.
- Examples of ground segment components include satellite dishes and receiving stations.

Data links

- the connection that shares information between the space and ground segments of a space system.
- includes the uplinks and downlinks, as well as services provided to the end users.



Source- UNIDIR, Space Security Lexicon (space segment, ground segment and data links)

Fig Source- Cerqueira, Christopher & Dos Santos, Walter & Ambrosio, Ana. (2013). Development of an Interface to a Spacecraft Simulator Empowered by Virtual Reality. SBC Journal on 3D Interactive Systems, 2, 27-44

THREAT VECTORS

Earth-to-Space



- the targeting of space segments by capabilities and/or techniques which originate from Earth.

Space-to-Space



- the targeting of space segments by capabilities and/or techniques which originate from other space objects.

Space-to-Earth



- the targeting of assets located on Earth or within Earth's atmosphere by capabilities and/or techniques which originate from space.

Earth-to-Earth



- the targeting of ground segments by capabilities and/or techniques which originate from Earth.

SPACE THREATS

KINETIC PHYSICAL OR HARD-KILL*

Direct ascent ASATs

Co-orbital - ASATs, dual-purpose objects including RPO

Ground station attacks

Space-based anti-missile interceptors

NON-KINETIC OR SOFT KILL

Non-kinetic physical

Electromagnetic pulse attack
(including nuclear detonation)

High-powered laser

High-powered microwave

Electronic

Jamming

Spoofing

MILITARY DOCTRINES/ NATIONAL LAWS AND POLICY

Cyber

Data intercept/monitoring

Data corruption

Seizure of control

**any of these (except the interceptors) could use a nuclear warhead*

CYBER THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS

SPACE SEGMENT

- * Command Intrusion
- * Payload Control
- * Denial of Service
- * Malware

USER SEGMENT


- * Spoofing
- * Denial of Service
- * Malware

LINK SEGMENT

- * Command Intrusion
- * Spoofing
- * Replay

GROUND SEGMENT


- * Hacking
- * Hijacking
- * Malware



CATEGORIES OF CYBER ATTACKS ON SPACE SYSTEMS

- Supply Chain Compromise
- Ground Segment Attacks
- Link Attacks (C2 / Data Links)
- User Segment Exploitation
- Satellite Compromise

SPACE DEBRIS



*Pic source- NASA
GIF source- ESA*



COUNTRIES' CAPABILITIES

	US	RUSSIA	CHINA	INDIA	AUS.	FRANCE	IRAN	ISRAEL	JAPAN	N. KOREA	S. KOREA	UK
LEO Direct Ascent	■	▲	▲	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
MEO/GEO Direct Ascent	■	■	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
LEO Co-Orbital	■	▲	▲	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●
MEO/GEO Co-Orbital	■	■	■	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●
Directed Energy	■	■	■	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●
Electronic Warfare	▲	▲	▲	■	■	■	■	▲	■	■	●	●
Space Situational Awareness	▲	▲	▲	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

LEGEND: NONE ● SOME ■ SIGNIFICANT ▲ UNCERTAIN ? NO DATA —

INTERNATIONAL SPACE TREATIES

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967)

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968)

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972)

Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976)

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1984)

Article I OST

"The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out **for the benefit and in the interests of all countries**, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, **on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law**, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies."

Article III OST

"States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with **international law, including the Charter of the United Nations**, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding."

**Article
2(4)
UN
Charter**

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the **threat or use of force** against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Article 51 UN Charter

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the **inherent right of individual or collective self-defence** if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the **United Nations**, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Article IV OST

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake **not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.**

The **Moon and other celestial bodies** shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for **peaceful purposes**. The establishment of **military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.**"

SPACE SECURITY APPROACHES



WHAT CAN YOU DO?

Space Odyssey: An Experimental Software Security Analysis of Satellites

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Abstract—Satellites are an essential aspect of our modern society and have contributed significantly to the way we live today, most notable through modern telecommunications, global positioning, and Earth observation. In recent years, and especially in the wake of the *New Space Era*, the number of satellite deployments has seen explosive growth. Despite its critical importance, little academic research has been conducted on satellite security and, in particular, on the security of onboard firmware. This lack likely stems from by now outdated assumptions on achieving security by obscurity, effectively preventing meaningful research on satellite firmware.

In this paper, we first provide a taxonomy of threats against satellite firmware. We then conduct an experimental security analysis of three real-world satellite firmware images. We base our analysis on a set of real-world attacker models and find several security-critical vulnerabilities in all analyzed firmware images. The results of our experimental security assessment show that modern in-orbit satellites suffer from different software security vulnerabilities and often a lack of proper access protection mechanisms. They also underline the need to overcome prevailing but obsolete assumptions. To substantiate our observations, we also performed a survey of 19 professional satellite developers to obtain a comprehensive picture of the satellite security landscape.

Index Terms—satellites, satellite security, space segment, satellite firmware, threat taxonomy, software security

in 2022 [2]. The vast majority of these satellites form mega-constellations like *Starlink*, which plans to launch more than 40,000 satellites in the coming years [3].

Small satellites [4] are at the heart of this *New Space Era* as their size and the widespread use of Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components makes them affordable even for small institutions. Furthermore, they cover a broad spectrum of use cases ranging from commercial applications (like Earth observation, machine-to-machine communication, and Internet services) to research applications, such as technology testing, weather and earthquake forecasting, and even interplanetary missions [5]–[8].


Although their applications vary widely, they commonly consist of radio equipment and antennas. Hence—in the broadest sense—all systems connected to a ground station on Earth, even to other satellites. Because the connections for command and control are often over the Internet, they are potentially as vulnerable as other connected IT platforms on Earth.

This issue has not been very relevant in the past. Access to ground stations was expensive and only large satellite operators could afford it. However, in recent years, the situation has changed. Nowadays, even small satellite operators are even affordable for private individuals. The emergence of Ground Station as a Service (GSaaS) such as those offered by *Amazon Web Services* [9], *Microsoft Azure* [10], the entry barrier has been lowered. We have seen in the mobile network sec-

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy

Introduction

This procedure is intended to give security researchers clear guidelines for conducting vulnerability discovery activities and to convey our preferences in how to submit discovered vulnerabilities to Iridium.



Vulnerability Disclosure Policy

The NASA Mission is to drive advances in science, technology, aeronautics, and space exploration to enhance knowledge, education, innovation, economic vitality and stewardship of the Earth. A great deal of NASA work leverages information technology to capture, interpret, and appropriately share scientific knowledge to further its Missions and Programs. NASA is committed to protecting the confidentiality (where appropriate), integrity, and availability of its information and information systems.

NASA recognizes that external vulnerabilities can be discovered by anyone at any time and has issued this policy.



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through Innovative Finance & Capacity Building



*A collaborative effort by
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


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Thank You!

Questions & Answers

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