# Cloud Storage Security & Privacy

#### whoami







starWarsVI = return new Jedi();

#### WTF are we talking about?

## **Cloud Storage**

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"It was much nicer before people started storing all their personal information in the cloud."

## Why cloud storage?

Price

## Why cloud storage?

Scalable

### Why cloud storage?

## Access anywhere

#### Cool stuff

Delta sync Sharing LAN P2P

## Skipping over details

## ...kinda the idea of cloud



## Challenge: Crypto

## Where can you encrypt?

## Encryption on client

# Pro: No key escrow Contra: Sharing, recovery

## Encryption by provider

# Pro: Sharing, recovery Contra: Escrow (MAFIAA)


## Encryption by provider



#### Deduplication


# Save storage & traffic! (at the cost of security)

#### **Traffic deduplication**



### Storage deduplication

## Same concept in storage



## Timeline

- •01. 10. 2010: CERT.fi contact
- •21. 10. 2010: Paper draft forwarded to Dropbox
- •27. 10. 2010: CERT.fi: Dropbox "is investigating" ----- March 2011: Hell breaks loose ----
- •12. 04. 2011: People send hashes & I DL stuff
- •13. 04. 2011: Dropbox mails us
- •24. 04. 2011: Temp fix in place
- •[soon after]: All fixed, but PR damage done

Moral of the story: Post exploits and startups listen.

#### Dropbox

# S3 storage EC2 transparent AES-256 Deduplication (SHA256) 4MB chunks


#### Our vectors

# Hash Manipulation Stolen Host ID "Cloud Slack Space"

#### Hash Manipulation

# Attack on traffic deduplication

#### **Traffic deduplication**




#### Attack

## **Client computes SHA256**

#### Attack

# Client computes SHA256 fakes

#### ...got data we don't actually own...



#### More effective

#### https://dl-clientXX.dropbox.com/retrieve hash=46983468573180109806

#### Side notes...

# 2<sup>2</sup>256 is HUGE Torrents use SHA1 Rapidshare-over-Dropbox!

#### Host ID

## 512 bit string Credentials after setup

#### Problems

# Stored unencrypted etc Grab & impersonate

#### Side notes...


# Not transferred in clear (\*cough\*NDSS\*cough\*)

Dropbox file upload (2010) "I wanna upload XX!" "Give me chunks XXY and XXZ." [store] "I wanna upload XX!" [link to account]

#### Hackers are lazy

[store]

## **m-(**



#### Effects

# Unlimited space Push data to other accounts

## Billy is here!



### Deletion

# When are chunks deleted?

### Deletion



## Piracy, yarr!




**PIRACY** Too important to be left up to Disney

#### "Backups"

# Pirate Bay's Top 100 on Dropbox?

#### "Backups"


# Yep, 97%



### Getting deduplication right

# Data possession protocol

### Data possession protocol



## Confusing graphs suck

Verify ownership: Sending a few bytes

### What Dropbox did

Encrypted host\_id Disabled traffic deduplication Removed unlinked file vuln



# Do what you say Be transparent Don't kill useful bugs ;)


### OMG the shouty man again!



### **QUBE Mini Wall of Sheep**

fgj-87HJ Titona12 Enorm2009

### The FAIL is so strong



### FIN

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"Dark Clouds on the Horizon: Using Cloud Storage as Attack Vector and Online Slack Space" "Guess Who Is Texting You? Evaluating the Security of Smartphone Messaging Applications"