

Incident Response and SAP Systems

Juan Pablo Perez-Etchegoyen jppereze@onapsis.com @jp_pereze Sergio Abraham <u>sabraham@onapsis.com</u> @serj_ab





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Transforming how organizations protect the applications that manage their business-critical processes and information.

- Founded: 2009
- Locations: Buenos Aires, AR | Boston, MA | Berlin, DE | Lyon, FR
- Technology: Onapsis X1 (Auditor Solution)

Onapsis Security Platform (Enterprise Solution)

(PCT patent-pending)

- Pricing: Subscription-based (Enterprise, Audit On-Demand and MSP)
- Research: 130+ SAP security advisories and presentations published

Who are We?

- Juan Perez-Etchegoyen (JP) CTO @ Onapsis
 - Background on Penetration Testing and vulnerabilities research
 - Reported vulnerabilities in different SAP and Oracle Products
- Sergio Abraham SAP Security Specialist @ Onapsis
 - Reported vulnerabilities in different SAP Products
 - Worked on the support of HANA in Onapsis products
- Both Authors/Contributors on diverse posts and publications
- Speakers and Trainers at Information Security Conferences







Agenda



- Incident Response
 - Concept
- First steps after any incident
 - Detection & Classification
 - Affected Assets
 - Legal actions
- Impact on SAP Systems
 - Prioritization
 - Affected information/processes
- Analysis phase
 - Logs, traces and tables
- Practical Scenario
- Conclusions

What should we expect out of this talk:

- Not a full/detailed Incident response procedure.
- Provides guidance and concepts around a complex topic (How to react and to proceed).
- Not a technical talk (do not expect any hardcore exploits)
- Not an hour talk.
- Open discussions by the end.
- Case study (not a real case) showing the analysis phase. Only relevant technical information is shown.

Identify improvements to better protect the business processes

Organizational approach to respond and manage the actions required to recover from an incident which is usually known as security breach or hack.

Objectives:


• Understand the root cause of the incident and the scope

of the compromise

- Limit damage (minimize impact)
 - Protect the company's reputation

Incident Response | Concept

- Recover (reducing time and costs)
 - keep processes running
- Incorporate lessons learned (procedures/documentation)







First Steps | Detection



What happened?

- Analysis of the symptom/s
 - "There are users created in production that we don't know where they came from"
 - "An email with confidential HR information is being distributed to employees"
 - "Disclosure of our long-term marketing strategy, which should be confidential"
- What's the severity of the incident?
 - Dimension of the impact
 - There are SAP_ALL users in production, they can do whatever they want!
 - Legal consequences and regulations might apply.
 - The company's image can be affected.

Incident Response | Classification



Availability -> Sabotage

- SAP System/service is *down and/or inoperable*
 - "ERP System is down"
 - "Customer service interface is not working"
- Confidentiality -> Espionage
 - SAP System information was *leaked*
 - "Employees salary is being spread through emails"
 - "Social Security Numbers and Bank accounts have been published on the Internet"
- Integrity -> Fraud
 - SAP System information was *altered*
 - "Employees are not receiving their salary, bank accounts... changed?"
 - "Balances are suspiciously inconsistent"



First Steps | Affected Assets



Assets can be represented in several ways:

- A piece of information
- A physical server
- An SAP System
- A database
- One instance of an SAP System



Affected Assets...

- □... should be chosen based on the symptoms
- ... will define the **scope** of an Incident Response Project

First Steps | Legal actions



Do we intend to prosecute? It is a one chance decision.

Not To Prosecute	To Prosecute
Simpler processes/investigations	Formal Investigation
Money: Less expensive	Money: Expensive
Time: Less expensive	Time: Expensive

Chain Of Custody :

- It includes security response teams, 3rd party specialists, law enforcement, white rooms, and so on.
- Implementing Chain of Custody in SAP environments is a real challenge. It requires states preservation, assets isolation, etc.
- Evidence must be admissible in court: reliable, usable, authenticated and integral
- In the end the person who is going to decide whether a piece of evidence is admissible for the court are the lawyers/prosecutors/judges.

Impact on SAP Systems | Prioritize



Are all SAP Systems equally important?

Huge amount of data -> Need of prioritization

Start by the most critical assets.

- Most critical business processes
- Daily transactions systems + Sensitive Data (ERP, HR)
- Key technical and security systems (SolMan, GRC)
- Highly interfaced systems (BW, PI)

Focus on Productive environments (but do not exclude the rest of the landscape, DEV/QA could be important too)

Impact on SAP Systems | Impact



□ Having identified the affected assets and prioritized the SAP Systems: Which information is at risk?


- Sensitive information in SAP Systems:
 - Social Security Number
 - Salary
 - Credit Cards
 - Health Insurance
 - Product Formulas
 - Bank accounts
 - Intellectual Property
 - Customer/Supplier data



- Data must have been previously classified in order to measure the risk exposure.
- What is the impact of disclosure or losing this information?
- How do we react to these threats?

Analysis phase





Analysis phase (contd)



Mechanism	Location
Security Audit Log	/usr/sap/ <sid>/<instance>/log/audit_date</instance></sid>
Developer traces	Directory: /usr/sap/ <sid>/<instance>/work/dev_*</instance></sid>
System Log	/usr/sap/ <sid>/<instance>/log/SLOG<sysnr></sysnr></instance></sid>
System Trace	/usr/sap/ <sid>/<instance>/</instance></sid> log/TRACE
Gateway Log	/usr/sap/ <sid>/<instance>/work/<file_name> <file_name> is defined by key LOGFILE</file_name></file_name></instance></sid>
Web Dispatcher Log	Specified by parameter icm/HTTP/logging_XX
WD Security Log	/usr/sap/ <sid>/<instance>/work/dev_icm_sec</instance></sid>
Table Change Logging	Table DBTABLOG
User & Auth.	Tables USH02, USH04, USH10, USH12
ABAP Change Doc.	Tables CDHDR, CDPOS



Case Study

Salaries has been distributed among employees


This information has been distributed in an e-mail among all employees

High confidential information

has been leaked!

It will get some people very angry. In fact, it will totally affect the work environment!

Symptom



onapsis

Employee A Emilio Estrada Josh Blackwell Pat Miller Stephen Benson Peter Douglas Jason King Susan Summer Michele Hazeltane Sam Spring Louse Levendon Franco Fall Maude Killerny

To: all@company.com

and we have more ...

Annual Salary USD140000.00 USD90000.00 USD120000.00 USD84000.00 USD210000.00 USD114000.00 USD90000.00 USD90000.00 USD90000.00 USD114000.00 USD138000.00



□ This information is on the SAP HR system. As a first approach, that should be the source we will look at (e.g.: HR1 was compromised).

Other systems interfacing with HR1 should also be analyzed ... ERP? BW? GRC?



Two big tasks:

Go to the root of the issue: Was HR1 compromised? How? By whom? Is there evidence of a backdoor?

Analyze the potential extent of the compromise (other systems).



□ HR1: Salaries information is located in table PA0008, and can be also commonly accessed using transaction PA20 or report RPLEHSU0.

Summary: We have three starting points.

- Transaction PA20
- Table PA0008
- Report RPLEHSU0

Check accesses to these objects and trace back their execution.

Display HR Master Data	
& <u>&</u>	
Find by ▼ Person • ∰ Collective search help • ∰ Search Term • ∰ Free search	Personnel No. Pers.Assgn
	Infotype text S Actions Period Organizational Assignment Period Personal Data Today Addresses All Addresses All Bank Details From curr.date Family Member/Dependents To Current month Challenge To Current Date Internal Medical Service To Current Period Maternity Protection/Parental Leave STy



Check the version of HR1 SAP System (different SAP Versions have different audit and trace features)

List all the available sources of information which can be useful to find the execution of transaction or reports and the reading of tables.

Security Audit	Log	Tł		ot the only sources			
STAD			â	available.			
		SAP Workload: Sing	le Statistical Re	cords - Overview			
Analysis of Security Audit Log 역 용 명 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값 값		Download 🕄 🖻 🛧 🔺	🕶 ∓ 🛄Disp. mode	📰 Sel. fields 🛛 💥 Server ID 🛛 🍘			
Analysis of Security Audit Log Period Requested 01.01.2014 12:00:00 - 14.01.2014 13:39:38 Period Selected 14.01.2014 13:24:25 - 14.01.2014 13:39:38		a de la contra de la		RFCs which responded (without errors): 2.03.2015 / 23:25:00 ed by time	1 (1)		
Server Audit Classes Dalog Logon RFC/CPIC Logon RFC Function Call		Started Server	Transaction	Program	T Scr	. Wp	User
Transaction Start Report Start User Master Change Other Events			*	*	*		*
System Events		20:41:36 labsapsrv006_DM1	L	RSPOWPOO	S	6	SAPSYS
Creation Date Date/Time User Terminal TCode Program	Security Audit Log message text	20:42:36 labsapsrv006_DM	Ĺ	(BATCH)	В	0	SAPSYS
14.01.2014 213:24:25 IDADMIN acertap SM19 SAPMSM19	Audit: Active Status Set to 1	20:42:36 labsapsrv006_DM	L	<auto ccms="" processing=""></auto>		1	SAPSYS
14.01.2014 13:24:25 IDADMIN acerbap SM19 SAPMSM19	Audit Configuration Changed	20:42:36 labsapsrv006_DM	Ľ	RSPOWPOO	ន	6	SAPSYS
14.01.2014 13:24:25 IDADMIN acerap SM19 SAPMSM19 14.01.2014 13:24:25 IDADMIN acerap SM19 SAPMSM19	Audit: Slot 1 Inactive Audit: Slot 2 Inactive	20:42:41 labsapsrv006_DM1	L	<delayed call="" function=""></delayed>	Z	0	SAPSYS
14.01.2014 13:24:25 IDADMIN acerap SM19 SAPMSH19	Audit Configuration Changed	20:43:36 labsapsrv006_DM1	6	AutoABAP	A 110	0 0	SAPSYS
14.01.2014 13:24:25 IDADMIN acerbap SM19 SAPMSM19	Audit: Slot 1: Class 191, Seventy 2, User *, Client 800,	20:43:36 labsapsrv006_DM1	L	<auto ccms="" processing=""></auto>		1	SAPSYS
14.01.2014 13:24:25 IDADMIN acertap 5M19 SAPMSM19	Audit Configuration Changed	20:43:36 labsapsrv006_DM		<ddloc cleanup=""></ddloc>	K	1	SAPSYS
© 2015 Onapsis Inc. All Rights F	Reserved	- 100-10-00 1-1-1	1	T	77	1	CADCAR



Security Audit Log

Check SM19 for Security Audit Log Events configuration

Filter 1	Filter 2				Filter 1	Filter 2		
⊘ Filter ac	tive	Rese	t Detailed Disp	olay	☑Filter act	tive	R	eset Detailed Display
Selection	criteria	Audit classes	Events		Selection c	riteria	Audit classes	Events
Client	800	Dialog logon	All	-	Client	800	☑Dialog logon	All
User	EMERGENCY	RFC/CPIC logon			User	*	RFC/CPIC logon	
		☑RFC call					RFC call	
		Transaction start					Transaction start	
		☑Report start					Report start	
		☑User master change					User master change	
		System					System	
		☑Other events					Other events	

We will have ALL events only for EMERGENCY user and

for the rest of the users only Logon events.



Security Audit Log

Check SM20.

• We can only see if EMERGENCY user executed PA20, RPLEHSU0 or read PA0008

04.03.2015	03:25:30	EMERGENCY	172.16.100.166	SESSION_MANAGER	SAPMSYST	Logon Successful (Type=A)
04.03.2015	03:25:30	EMERGENCY	172.16.100.166	SESSION_MANAGER	RSRZLLGO	Report RSRZLLGO Started
04.03.2015	03:25:30	EMERGENCY	172.16.100.166	SESSION MANAGER	RSRZLLGO_ACTUAL	Report RSRZLLG0_ACTUAL Started
04.03.2015	03:25:31	EMERGENCY	172.16.100.160	SU01	SAPLSMTR_NAVIGATION	Transaction SU01 Started
04.03.2015	03:25:31	EMERGENCY	172.16.100.166	SU01	SAPMSUUD	Report SAPMSUUD Started
04.03.2015	03:25:36	EMERGENCY	172.16.100.106	PFCG	SAPLSMTR_NAVIGATION	Transaction PFCG Started

We have the clue that EMERGENCY user accessed to user management transactions,

but didn't use any of the objects we are looking for.

First user to take into account: EMERGENCY in client 800 and an IP address

First actions:

- Check if that IP is from a valid user.
- Check the policy of EMERGENCY user access



STAD

It only "adds" information. If the information is retrieved quickly (48 hours by default) after the incident, then it can be useful to trace back activities on the system.

Started	Server	Transaction	Program	T Scr. Wp	User
		*	*	*	*
08:46:17	labsapsrv006_DM1		RSPOWPOO	S 6	SAPSYS
08:46:59	labsapsrv006_DM1		Login_Pw	D 0020 0	UNKNOWN
08:47:06	labsapsrv006_DM1		SAPMSYST	D 0120 0	A0123456
08:47:07	labsapsrv006_DM1	SESSION_MANAGER	SAPLSMTR_NAVIGATION	D 0100 0	A0123456
08:47:09	labsapsrv006_DM1	SE16	SAPLSETB	D 0230 0	A0123456
08:47:13	labsapsrv006_DM1	SE16	/1BCDWB/DBPA0008	D 1000 O	A0123456
08:47:13	labsapsrv006_DM1		<delayed call="" function=""></delayed>	Z 1	SAPSYS
08:47:15	labsapsrv006_DM1	SE16	/1BCDWB/DBPA0008	D 0120 0	A0123456
08:47:17	labsapsrv006 DM1		(BATCH)	во	SAPSYS



STAD

It also allows to get more in-depth information that could be very useful!

Started	Server	Transaction	Prop We were lucky! If the We were this table was access to this table was access to this point in time, it	T Scr. Wp	User
		*		*	*
08:46:17	labsapsrv006 DM1			S 6	SAPSYS
08:46:59	labsapsrv006 DM1		harder to ge information.	D 0020 0	UNKNOWN
08:47:06	labsapsrv006 DM1		information	D 0120 0	A0123456
08:47:07	labsapsrv006 DM1	SESSION MANAGER	- IGATION	D 0100 0	A0123456
08:47:09	labsapsrv006 DM1	SE16	AFLSETB	D 0230 0	A0123456
08:47:13	labsapsrv006_DM1	SE16	/1BCDWB/DBPA0008	D 1000 O	A0123456
08:47:13	labsapsrv006 DM1		<pre><delayed call="" function=""></delayed></pre>	Z 1	SAPSYS
08:47:15	labsapsrv006_DM1	SE16	/1BCDWB/DBPA0008	D 0120 O	A0123456
08:47:17	labsapsrv006 DM1		(BATCH)	B 0	SAPSYS

It seems user A0123456 used SE16 to read table PA0008. Just double-click on the row.



Summary

- EMERGENCY user was used without requesting it, but at the naked eye, didn't do much.
- An IP Address from where the EMERGENCY user was connected **172.16.100.166**.
- There is an unknown user called A0123456 which actually accessed to table PA0008 from SE16 transaction.

Next steps:

- Trace back the creation of user A0123456.
- Was the system compromised? How?
- Is there evidence of a backdoor?



SUIM Change Documents

This report will show exactly who created the user A0123456.

Selection User From Date To Date From Time To Time	•	I CP	* 04.03.2015 04.03.2015 00:00:00 23:59:59					
User	Date	Time	Changed By	Action	Old Value Te	ext New Value	Text for the New Value	TCode
A0123456	04.03.2015	04:44:48	SABRAHAM	Initial User Type		S	Service User	SU01
				Password changed		New Password 1		SU01
				Password status changed		Productive		SU01
				Profile added		SAP_ALL	All SAP System authorizations	
				User created				

Due to the lack of Security Audit Log events, this is the only information available.

Table USR02 will show also who created it, but this report collects more information.



- The user belongs to an employee on vacations. He couldn't do it.
- Hypothesis: Could someone have used the account instead?
- □ His office remained closed with a key. It seems that nobody should have been able to get to his office and use his computer.
- □ It could have been done from another host, potentially: **172.16.100.166**.
- EMERGENCY user connected without being authorized
- Would have somebody obtained both credentials?
- □Next task:
 - Check low hanging fruit issues that could provide access to the SAP System
 - SAPXPG remote command execution?
 - Oracle External Authentication?
 - Any other unauthorized accesses to operating system level or database level?



SAPXPG Remote Command Execution

Gateway Logging: Transaction SMGW -> Goto -> Expert Functions -> Logging

Gateway Logging would show valuable information related to external servers, and remote connections.

Log Events			
D 1			
File Name			
Name of Log File	gw_log-20	015-03-04	
File Name	gw_log-%	sy-%m-%d	
	Special Ch	aracter for Generating File Name	
	%y=year,	%m=month, %d=day, %h=hour, %t=minute, %s	s=second
Log Events	%y=year,	%m=month, %d=day, %h=hour, %t=minute, %	s=second
	%y=year,		s=second
Network	%y=year,	Open RFC Connection	s=second
	%y=year,		s=second
Network	%y=year,	Open RFC Connection	s=second
Network		Open RFC Connection RFC Actions (Open/Close/Send/Receive)	s=second
Network Start/Stop/Signals	esses Only)	 Open RFC Connection RFC Actions (Open/Close/Send/Receive) External Programs 	s=second

Sadly, these events are not enabled



- Oracle External Authentication
 - Check Listener.log
 - /oracle/<SID>/saptrace/diag/tnslsnr/<server_name>/listener/ (Oracle 11g)

03-MAR-2015 09:36:34 * (CONNECT_DATA=(SERVICE_NAME=DM1)(CID=(PROGRAM=C:\instantclient_11_2\sqlplus.exe) (HOST=1C943B28)(USER=dm1adm))) * (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp)(HOST=172.16.100.166)(PORT=1299)) * establish * DM1 * 0

An unauthorized user connected using the external authentication and <SID>adm user

It means that most likely the attacker had full access to the database. He could have left backdoors behind.



Summary

- After tracking down 172.16.100.166 IP address, IT team identified it and it belongs to a shared computer used for diverse purposes.
- The attacker gained full access to the database: he/she may have had access to the USR02 table, potentially cracking user passwords (i.e. SABRAHAM and EMERGENCY). The extent of the compromise could have gone beyond these users, getting more sensitive information.
- The attacker has knowledge of SAP Attacks, SAP Transactions and tables.
- In fact, if the attacker got access to the database, why creating a user in SAP and used SE16 to read PA0008? Other possible actions performed by the attacker should also be analyzed.

Next Steps

- Delete user A0123456. Check validity of ALL users and change ALL passwords.
- Check user activity on other systems (usually shared passwords may appear)
- RFC Destinations to other systems. Check for incoming calls from HR1 in adjacent Systems.
- Check Business and Technical data integrity.



- Check integrity (perform integrity hash comparisons)
 - Check procedures code
 - Check triggers code
 - Check functions code
 - Check security-related parameters in database and SAP
 - Check REPOSRC table (ABAP Code) after a system restart
 - Check the integrity of your business data

Go alive again!

REPOLOAD table can be refreshed

Wrapping up



- Incident Response is all about the process, where every step must be documented:
 - Detection of the incident
 - Classification of the incident
 - Decision on legal actions
 - Hypothesis of affected Assets
 - Hypothesis of affected information (risk exposure)
 - Assets Prioritization
 - Information extraction phase \rightarrow (live forensics)
 - Analysis phase
 - Lessons learned

Conclusions



- An Incident Response Process is **key** in corporate environments.
- SAP Systems hold the most valuable information in the company, therefore they must be part of our company Incident Response Process.
- If an incident is detected, the whole landscape could be the scope of the analysis, not just Productive environments.
- There is no much experience and documentation around Incident Response on SAP systems. It requires very specific skills and knowledge of SAP logging features and limitations.
- Though there are only a few Incidents related to SAP systems hitting the news, they exist because of the criticality of its information. Confidentiality is a key requirement of these projects.

Open questions...



- As in this example, finding the root cause and/or the origin is not always possible.
- There are some challenges regarding accessibility to the information.
 - Are the systems patched, so we can rely on the logging mechanisms?
 - Are the logs always there?
 - Do the stored logs have a validity period?
 - Are the logs deleted after a certain period of time?
 - Are the logs sent to a centralized location?
 - How much time after the incident, the incident response was triggered?
- Is an interdisciplinary team required? Should SAP and non-SAP teams work together?
- Experience around SAP Incident Response in the audience?
 - Happened to your company (hopefully not)
 - Helping an SAP customer to identify the root cause

References



- Previous Troopers conferences:
 - SAP Forensics (2013)
 - SAP Anti-Forensics (2014)
 - BIZEC Workshop (2015)
 - Security Audit Log: <u>https://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw74/helpdata/en/4D/41BEC4AA601C86E10000000A42189B/frameset.htm</u>
- STAD: http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70/helpdata/en/c1/0dbf62e04311d286d6006008b32e84/content.htm
- SUIM Change Documents: <u>http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/90/c3e45b841f214ca32fcc17f7eb059e/content.htm</u>
- Gateway Logging: <u>http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw73ehp1/helpdata/en/48/b2a710ca1c3079e10000000a42189b/content.htm</u>
- Listener.log (Oracle): <u>http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B10501_01/network.920/a96580/troubles.htm#444555</u>
- Special thanks to Nahuel Sanchez and the Onapsis Research Labs!



Questions? Juan Pablo Perez-Etchegoyen jppereze@onapsis.com @jp_pereze

Sergio Abraham <u>sabraham@onapsis.com</u> @serj_ab

