



# Ghost In The Shell

Troopers13, March 11th – 15th, Heidelberg





## Andreas Wiegenstein

- SAP Security Researcher, active since 2003
  - Received Credits from SAP for more than 20 reported 0-day Vulnerabilities
- Speaker at international Conferences
  - **SAP TechEd** 2004 (USA & Europe) / 2005 (USA) / 2006 (USA), DSAG 2009
  - **BlackHat** 2011 (Europe), **Hack in the Box** 2011 (Europe)
  - **Troopers** 2011, 2012, 2013, **RSA** 2012 (USA), **IT Defense** 2013
- Co-Author of „Sichere ABAP Programmierung“ (SAP Press)


## Xu Jia

- SAP Security Researcher, active since 2006
  - Received Credits from SAP for more than 15 reported 0-day Vulnerabilities
- Speaker at SAP-focused Conferences
  - **Sicherheit und Prüfung von SAP Systemen** 2012



- 1. SAP Technology Basics**
- 2. SAP Security / Forensic Basics**
- 3. Ghost in the Shell**
- 4. Mechanics of the Ghost**
- 5. Summary**

# SAP Technology Basics



Source: <http://www.productiveflourishing.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Simplifying-Complexity.jpg>



## Why protect SAP Systems?

- More than 176,000 companies run SAP
- SAP customers...
  - Transport > 1.1 billion flight passengers per year
  - Produce > 65% of all TV's
  - Produce > 77,000 cars every day
  - Produce > 52% of all movies
- And...
  - **72% of the world-wide beer production depends on companies that run SAP !!!**



Source: [http://www.posters.at/the-simpsons--homer-bier\\_a34273.html](http://www.posters.at/the-simpsons--homer-bier_a34273.html)




How many ... exist in Release ... ?	Release	Answer
<i>... DB tables</i>	Basis 7.20	~ 81,000
<i>... SLOC*</i>	Basis 7.20	~ 37.9 Mio
<i>... Executable programs</i>	Basis 7.20	~ 38,000
<i>... DB tables</i>	ECC 6.0	~ 384,000
<i>... SLOC*</i>	ECC 6.0	~172.8 Mio
<i>... Executable programs</i>	ECC 6.0	~221,000

\* SLOC = Source Lines of Code

# Classic SAP Architecture



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


## Who works with SAP GUI and why?

- **Employees**
  - Daily work  
(running multi-million \$ Companies)
- **Administrators**
  - System Maintenance & Configuration
  - User Maintenance
- **Developers**
  - Write custom ABAP Code (extend standard Solutions)

### In short:

- Users with a wide Range of Privileges work with SAP GUI.
- User Access to SAP Backend is still done via SAP GUI in 99% of the Cases





## What is SAP GUI?

- Proprietary (Fat) Client
  - EXE Running on Windows (a Java Version is also available)
  - Access to Client OS (file system, shell, registry, clipboard, ...)
  - Scriptable
- Proprietary Communication Protocol (DIAG)
  - Up- and download of files and data from screen elements
  - Data is transferred in a compressed format

## Summary:

- SAP GUI is a powerful tool that manages data transfers between frontend and backend

# SAP Security / Forensic Basics



## Roles and Authorizations



- Restrict User Access to Data and Business Logic

## Accountability

- Log Changes to relevant Data
- Trace DB Access, Program Execution, ...

## Client Separation

- Protect Data of different Organizations on the same SAP System





**Very few monitoring tasks are active all the time.**

## **Audit Information System / Security Audit Log (should be active)**

- (Failed) (Remote) Logon Events, Server Events
- Program execution, Debugging
- User maintenance
- ...

## **System Trace (not active, due to high data volume)**

- List of performed authorization checks and their results
- List of executed OSQL commands
- ...

# Ghost in The Shell





VF Advisory: **SAP-GHO-01**

SAP Note: 1529235

Advisory: 03.11.2010

Fix Date: 27.09.2011

CVSS Base Score: 6.0

CVSS Base Vector: AV:N/AC:M/AU:S/C:P/I:P/A:P



VF Advisories: **SAP-ZONE-01, SAP-ZONE-02**

SAP Note: 1560489

Advisory: 18.01.2011

Fix Date: 27.09.2011

CVSS Base Score: 6.0

CVSS Base Vector: AV:N/AC:M/AU:S/C:P/I:P/A:P

# Mechanics of the Ghost



## Passive Request Forgery (PRF)

- Attack User Session through Trap
- Examples:
  - Cross-Site Request Forgery
  - Cross-Application Request Forgery (Troopers 2011)




## Active Request Forgery (ARF)

- Attack User Session immediately
- Examples:
  - Ghost in the Shell

# PRF is asynchronous. Be patient.




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# ARF is synchronous. Much better!



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# Summary



- Make sure you always have the latest security patches installed
- Check your custom code for malicious commands





## Links

SAP Security Advisories researched by Virtual Forge  
<http://www.codeprofilers.com/index.php/advisories.html>

## Organizations



BIZEC – Business Security Initiative  
<http://www.bizec.org>


## Literature




Sichere ABAP-Programmierung  
(SAP PRESS, 372 S., 2009)  
*Andreas Wiegenstein, Markus Schumacher,  
Sebastian Schinzel, Frederik Weidemann*



# Questions?



Source <http://ostatic.com/pacman/screenshot/1>





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# Contact Information

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